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Objectives of the Study 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibited a large number of individual auditor-provided non-audit 
services, which were seen to have a negative effect on auditor independence. Tax services were 
not included in the list, implying that the effects of these services should somehow differ from 
those of other consulting services. Research on all non-audit services however has yielded 
contradictory results. This study sets out to illustrate the possible effects of tax services using 
prior research on all services as a framework, and attempts to shed some light on the issue 
whether the effects of tax services actually are significantly different from those of the other 
non-audit services. 
 
Research Method and Data  
The methods used in the paper follow the research of Frankel et al. (2002) which approaches 
independence concerns by examining whether strong economic bonds between auditor and 
client lead to opportunistic earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals. A 
modification to the method also allows a separate examination of auditor-provided tax services. 
The sample used in the models consists of financial statements from 2415 individual North 
American firms for the financial year 2010.  
 
Findings of the Study  
This study provides heteroscedasticity-robust evidence that there is no statistically significant 
association between auditor-provided tax services and earnings management. The results are 
robust to differences in auditor fee composition, to the direction of earnings management as 
well as to audit client firm size. Since the goal of this paper and the methods used in it is not to 
measure possible knowledge spillovers, one can only speculate whether the absence of such an 
association could mean that there are no audit-quality improving knowledge spillovers 
retainable from the provision of tax services, or that the provision of tax services simply does 
not have an effect on auditor independence. 
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Tutkimuksen tavoitteet 
Sarbanes-Oxley kielsi suuren määrän yksittäisiä tilintarkastajan tarjoamia tarkastuksen 
ulkopuolisia palveluita, joilla nähtiin olevan kielteinen vaikutus tilintarkastajan 
riippumattomuuteen. Veropalveluita ei kielletty, minkä takia lainsäätäjän oletuksena näyttäisi 
olevan, että veropalveluiden vaikutus eroaa muista tarkastuksen ulkopuolisista palveluista. 
Tutkimustulokset kaikkien palveluiden osalta ovat kuitenkin ristiriitaisia ja tämän tutkimuksen 
tavoitteena on tuoda verokonsultoinnin mahdollisia riippumattomuusvaikutuksia kattavasti 
esille käyttäen hyväksi aiemman kaikkien palveluiden tutkimuksen viitekehystä sekä lisäksi 
tarkastella sitä, eroaako veropalveluiden vaikutus tosiasiassa konsultointipalveluiden 
vaikutuksesta. 
 
Tutkimusmenetelmä ja aineisto 
Tämän tutkimuksen menetelmät noudattavat lähestymistapaa, jossa tarkastajan 
riippumattomuutta lähestytään tutkimalla asiakkaan kanssa kehittyneen taloudellisen sidoksen 
vaikutusta johdon tuloksenohjailuun, jota puolestaan mitataan harkinnanvaraisten 
jaksotuserien määrällä. (Frankel et al. 2002). Menetelmää muokkaamalla myös 
veropalveluiden erityisvaikutus voidaan ottaa tarkastelun aiheeksi. Tutkimuksen aineistona on 
2415 pohjoisamerikkalaista yritystä tilinpäätösvuodelta 2010. 
 
Tutkimustulokset 
Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että tarkastajan tarjoamille veropalveluilla ei ole tilastollisesti 
merkitsevää yhteyttä johdon tuloksenohjailuun. Johtopäätökset säilyvät samoina kun 
huomioon otetaan myös mahdollisesti heteroskedastinen aineisto, tilintarkastajien erilaiset 
palkkiojakaumat, tuloksenohjailun tulosvaikutuksen suunta sekä asiakasyrityksien eriävät 
kokoluokat. Koska tutkimuksen tavoitteena ei ollut mitata veropalveluista saatavan tiedon 
hyötyä, näiden tuloksien valossa voidaan vain spekuloida, eikö veropalveluiden tarjoamisesta 
saada tarkastuksen laatuun vaikuttavaa tietoa vai eikö tilintarkastajan tarjoamilla 
veropalveluilla yksinkertaisesti ole vaikutusta tilintarkastajan riippumattomuuteen. 
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1) Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Auditor-provided non-audit services have been examined by accounting researchers for 
many decades, but during the last decade the topic became subject to an especially 
heated academic debate. The Enron-crisis and the public trial of its audit firm Arthur 
Andersen can be seen as the starting point of this new wave of studies. Andersen 
knowingly ignored Enron’s high-risk accounting practices and a common view is that 
this was due to the fact Andersen had become biased since it also received substantial 
fees from Enron for performing non-audit services. 
Many opponents of auditor-provided non-audit services even demand that they should 
be banned in general. Their view is that acting both in the role of an auditor as well as a 
consultant compromises auditor independence and objectivity. Proponents of non-audit 
services however argue that performing both services improves the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the audit because of the resulting more comprehensive understanding of 
the client’s business. (Joe et al. 2007) 
Non-audit services have also become a topic on the legislative level. One of the most 
significant legislative changes in the matter has been the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) in the USA. In order to promote auditor independence and increase audit quality, 
SOX prohibits a number of specific auditor-provided non-audit services. However it did 
not prohibit tax services, because these were considered to provide benefits to the 
taxpayer in forms of lower cost of capital and increased after-tax earnings. Regulators 
continue to debate whether jointly provided audit and tax services impair auditor 
independence in the same way as other non-audit services do. (Omer et al. 2006) 
Auditor independence and non-audit fees therefore remain a current and interesting 
topic, which was recently brought back to the public’s attention by the European 
Commission’s green paper on audit policy after the financial crisis and the resulting 
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proposal to prohibit auditor-provided non-audit services in public-interest entities. 
(European Commission, 2011) 
 
1.2 Research Purpose and Structure 
Non-audit services are a broadly-researched topic. Prior research has mainly focused on 
the earlier mentioned controversy of their effects on auditor independence and on the 
other hand on audit quality and efficiency. In these research papers non-audit services 
have most of the time been grouped together to a single unit, and separate service types 
have only scarcely been individually examined. The legislation in place however 
implies that tax services can be seen as a separate type of service when compared to the 
other non-audit services. 
The above mentioned controversial special status of auditor-provided tax services is the 
basis of this research paper. The aim is to present a thorough look into the theory and 
prior research of non-audit services in general, and to fill in the research gap by 
examining the role of auditor-provided tax services using the same theoretical 
background and methodological approach. In order to ensure a broad view on the 
possible effects of tax services as an individual service type, I will first provide a 
literature review on the prior research on all non-audit services. The purpose of this 
paper is thus to examine, whether separating auditor-provided tax services from other 
non-audit services is justifiable when it comes to speculations on their effect on auditor 
independence. In short, the research purpose can be summarized in the following 
research question:  
 Does the effect of tax services on auditor independence differ from the effect of 
other non-audit services? 
The mentioned justifications have also been re-examined after SOX. In 2006 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new rules on auditor 
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independence, which limit the types of auditor-provided tax services audit firms can 
offer their SEC clients. These rules identify circumstances, where the provision of tax 
services impairs independence, including for example opining in favor of transactions 
that are based on aggressive interpretations of tax laws and regulations. The fact that 
there are renewed legislative efforts to restrict auditor-provided tax services implies a 
need for academic research into this issue. (Robinson, 2008) 
The purpose of the study is based on US legislation, which limits the choice of relevant 
prior research. In order to avoid inconsistencies, only material from the same region is 
used in the literature review. The structure of the paper is as follows: Chapter 1.3 
introduces the legislation relevant for the research purpose and Chapter 1.4 defines 
auditor independence. Section 2) contains a literature review on the different issues and 
perspectives examined in prior research. Section 3) transforms the research question 
into hypotheses based on prior research. Section 4) introduces the research design as 
well as the data used in the study. Section 5) introduces the empirical results while the 
sixth and final section summarizes these results in addition to providing conclusions and 
possible topics for further research. 
 
1.3 Sarbanes-Oxley’s Restrictions to Non-Audit Services 
The purpose of auditing is to verify the financial reports provided by the management of 
a firm to the owners (Antle, 1984). From the perspective of the principal-agent problem 
it is vital that those performing the monitoring are independent of those being monitored 
(Cohen, 2002). In the wake of the Enron-scandal, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act set new 
demands for auditor independence. It listed nine auditor-provided non-audit services 
which were seen to compromise the independence of audit firms. These services are 
(Gray & Manson, 2008, p. 96): 
 bookkeeping and other services related to accounting records or financial 
statements of the audit client 
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 financial information systems design and implementation  
 appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports 
 actuarial services 
 internal audit outsourcing services 
 management functions or human resources 
 broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services 
 legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit 
 any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible 
 
The recommendations given by the European Commission are similar, but do not 
provide restrictions as strict as SOX. A notable fact for accounting professionals outside 
the USA is that the restrictions of SOX also apply to audit firms which operate outside 
the US, but whose audit client’s parent company is registered in the United States. 
(Gray & Manson, 2008) Additionally, in several countries outside the USA tax services 
are defined as a legal service which also complicates the interpretation of the Act (SEC, 
2002). 
 
In the eyes of the regulator tax services are therefore not seen to pose the same risk of 
impairing auditor independence as the other non-audit services. SOX defines tax 
services as all services performed by the professional staff in the independent 
accountant’s tax division except the ones related to the audit. These would typically, 
among other things, include services regarding the preparation of tax returns and tax 
planning, in addition to tax advice related to mergers and acquisitions, employee benefit 
plans and requests for rulings or technical advice from tax authorities. (SEC, 2002) 
The research on non-audit services has however provided contradicting results, even 
when it comes to all other non-audit services. Some research suggests that performing 
non-audit services exposes the audit firm to information that is relevant for the auditor’s 
risk assessment, which might lead to a more effective audit (e.g. Joe et al. 2007; 
Vandervelde, 2006). According to Antle (1984) however the whole idea behind the 
debate relating to auditor-provided non-audit services is that the fees received by the 
auditor for the services might be seen to impair auditor independence. Impaired 
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independence again is often presumed to lead to lower-quality audits and an increased 
likelihood of financial reporting that violates generally accepted accounting principles 
(Kinney, 2004). 
Regulators argue that the effect of tax services on auditor independence differs from the 
other non-audit services, because tax services require following detailed laws and 
accounting firms have also historically provided a large amount of tax services to their 
audit clients. Nevertheless the regulation regarding tax services and auditor 
independence has raised considerable debate and received mixed comments from the 
public. Some are in favor of prohibiting all tax services for clarity reasons while others 
argue that only specific tax services should be permitted. In contrast to this, the SEC has 
also received research papers indicating that performing both tax and audit services 
improves audit quality as well as diminishes instances of financial restatements. The 
SEC responded to the debate by re-iterating its position that an audit firm can provide 
tax services without impairing its independence. (SEC, 2002) 
On the other hand, also tax services have been at least on some level regulated by SOX. 
According to its subsequently modified fee disclosure rules the professional fees paid to 
an audit firm must be reported in the following categories: Audit Fees (1), Audit-
Related Fees (2), Tax Fees (3), and All Other Fees (4) (Schneider et al. 2006). 
Additionally, the SEC admitted that in certain situations the provision of tax services 
could jeopardize auditor independence. Specifically, representing the client in a tax 
court or federal court of claims is mentioned as one of these circumstances. The SEC 
also stated that audit committees should carefully scrutinize the retention of an auditor 
who has recommended a transaction whose sole purpose may be tax avoidance and 
whose tax treatment may not be in line with the related regulations. (SEC, 2002) 
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1.4 Definition of Auditor Independence 
According to the International Federation of Accountants’ (IFAC) code of ethics for 
professional accountants it is in the public interest that the members of audit teams, 
firms and network firms stay independent of audit clients. The concept of independence 
in the code is divided into independence of mind and independence in appearance, 
which the code defines as follows (IFAC, 2012, p. 46-47):  
 
 “Independence of mind: the state of mind that permits the expression of a 
conclusion without being affected by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity and exercise 
objectivity and professional skepticism.” 
 “Independence in appearance: the avoidance of facts and circumstances that 
are so significant that a reasonable and informed third party would be likely to 
conclude, weighing all the specific facts and circumstances, that a firm’s, or a 
member of the audit team’s, integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism has 
been compromised.” 
The concept of independence in appearance is one of the key issues in the debate on 
auditor-provided non-audit services. Introducing a “third party” into the definition 
shows how subjective the concept of auditor independence can be. Even in 
circumstances where an auditor is convinced that he/she is acting with independence of 
mind, a third party can always have suspicions about impaired auditor objectivity. This 
is vital to keep in mind when estimating the effects of auditor-provided tax services on 
auditor independence, because in addition to the arguments made by regulators, also the 
perceptions of various stakeholders such as equity holders and lenders have to be taken 
into consideration. 
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2) Literature Review 
The structure of this section is based on commonly-used theoretical concepts in the 
study of all non-audit services and auditor independence i.e. both independence of 
appearance and independence of mind as well as effects on audit efficiency/quality 
through knowledge spillovers. (Please see Figure 1).  Using these same concepts in the 
approach to tax services enables one to get a similar general view of their possible 
effects and therefore to create a reference base. The mentioned three concepts of 
independence in appearance, independence of mind as well as knowledge spillovers also 
reflect the perspectives of the three stakeholder groups that have usually been 
considered in previous literature: financial statement users, auditors and managers 
(Schneider et al. 2006). 
 
Figure 1 Theoretical Concepts Used in Prior Research of Non-Audit Services 
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical concepts used as a framework in this study. The 
demand for auditor independence of mind as well as independence in appearance can be 
seen to arise from agency theory (Gray & Manson 2008, p.9). Information gathered 
while performing non-audit services on the other hand affects an auditor’s risk 
assessment (Joe et al. 2007), which according to the Audit Risk –model has a positive 
effect on audit quality and efficiency. This information transfer is referred to as the 
knowledge spillover effect. 
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2.1 Non-Audit Services’ Effect on Independence in Appearance 
2.1.1 Equity Investors’ Perceptions of Independence 
Non-audit services have also previously been divided into different types based on their 
effect on auditor independence. In 1984 prohibited services included e.g. actuarial 
services and services relating to executive recruitment. In this similar situation, Pany et 
al.’s (1984) survey study directed at stockholders and financial analysts did not find 
differences in perceptions between the services considered acceptable and the ones 
being strictly controlled.  
In a more recent study Jenkins et al. (2001) examined the perceptions of accounting 
professionals in addition to the ones of the general public. Their results showed that 
when it comes to the perceived influence of non-audit services on auditor independence, 
professionals separate the effect of e.g. tax services to be positive while e.g. legal 
services are perceived to have a negative effect. The general public however did not 
separate different service types from one another, but reacted negatively towards all 
non-audit services in general.  Jenkins et al. (2001) point out that there might be an 
expectation gap between the two groups. Accounting professionals expect the 
perceptions of the general public to be similar to their own, but in the light of scientific 
research findings these expectations are not fulfilled. One reason for the differing 
perceptions might be that accounting professionals are more familiar with the ethical 
guidelines relating to the audit profession and partially even have auditing experience 
(Schneider et al. 2006). 
When dividing non-audit services into separate types one must keep the concept of 
independence in appearance as well as the agency theory in mind. The perceptions of 
accounting professionals seem to follow current regulations, but the reaction of equity 
investors is not that clear-cut. From the agency theory –perspective however the goal of 
auditing is to enhance the credibility of financial reports prepared by management for 
the owners, and thus to diminish the risk of flawed reporting stemming from the conflict 
of interests between the two parties (Eilifsen, 2009). Therefore the theory sets this 
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agency problem as the basis for the whole audit function.  This leads to the question, 
whether separating tax services from the other non-audit services in light of their 
influence on auditor independence is justified, if the owners nevertheless seem to react 
to all services as a whole. 
Krishnamurty et al. (2006) studied equity investors’ reactions towards non-audit 
services by examining how the criminal indictment of Arthur Andersen affected the 
stock market’s perception of auditor independence. Their results indicated negative 
abnormal returns for all Andersen’s client companies and more importantly, these 
abnormal returns were significantly higher in companies where the market perceived 
auditor independence to be threatened. In their study the ratio of audit fees to total fees 
as well as the total level of fees is used as a proxy for auditor independence. 
Krishnamurty et al. (2006, p.484) conclude:”When the auditor provides more non-audit 
services, the perception of auditor independence is more likely to be impaired, and the 
market prices this”. Because prior research suggests that equity investors react to non-
audit services as a whole, these conclusions can also be seen to relate to tax services, 
which were also included in the study. 
On the other hand making generalizations about the effects of non-audit services on 
auditor independence from Krishnamurty’s results is questionable, because the study 
was conducted in exceptional circumstances. The more non-audit services were offered, 
the more the share prices dropped. In practice however it is hard to show whether the 
cause of the lower share prices was the market’s perceptions of non-audit services, or 
the tarnished reputation of Arthur Andersen. Different arguments have been made 
concerning this question. For example Chaney et al. (2002) did not find evidence to 
support the idea that Andersen’s independence was questioned by the amount of non-
audit fees charged to its clients. 
The specific effects of tax services on the owners’ perceptions of auditor independence 
have not been established since research taking the equity investors’ view usually does 
not divide non-audit services into different types. In 2003 however, as the disclosure 
rules on non-audit fees were updated, tax services were also taken into consideration in 
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the research on non-audit services. Then the services were to be disclosed in three 
categories: audit related fees (1), tax fees (2) and other fees (3). Mishra et al. (2005) 
found evidence suggesting that the proportion of shareholders voting against auditor 
ratification is positively correlated with both the tax fee ratio as well as the “other” fee 
ratio. Therefore this result does not support the regulator’s assumption that investors 
would not perceive tax services as negatively as the other non-audit services. 
Apart from the study mentioned above, the effects of tax services from the shareholders’ 
point of view have not been studied. Fortin et al. (2008) point out that this is a field that 
future research should shed a light on. Equity investors’ perceptions of the auditor’s 
provision of non-audit services in general have usually been studied by investigating 
investor behavior, market reactions and corporate governance issues such as the 
shareholders’ willingness to ratify auditor selection. All in all the findings on whether 
the provision of auditor-provided non-audit services in general impairs the equity 
investors’ perceptions of auditor independence are mixed. (Schneider et al. 2006) 
 
2.1.2 Lenders’ Perceptions of Independence 
The findings relating to the lenders’ perceptions of non-audit services in general are also 
contradictory. Lowe et al. (1999) state that outsourcing a company’s internal audit 
functions to the company’s external auditor can be associated with negative perceptions 
of auditor independence and financial statement reliability. This again can lead to lower 
loan acceptance rates, especially if the audit firm performs management functions with 
respect to the internal audit. The independence concerns can however be reduced by 
separating the audit firm’s engagement team providing the internal services from the 
one providing the external audit. On the other hand a survey study by Pany et al. (1988) 
involving loan officers and financial analysts found little, if any, evidence supporting 
the idea that providing non-audit services influences credit granting decisions or 
perceptions of financial statement reliability and auditor independence. 
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In the research on lenders’ perceptions of non-audit services different service types are 
more often examined individually than in the previously-introduced research focusing 
on the investors’ point of view. This might be based on a similar expectation gap to the 
one existing between accounting professionals and the general public. Similarly to 
accounting professionals, also lenders tend to separate different types of non-audit 
services from one another more often than equity investors do. This might again be due 
to differences in experience and expertise. 
Tax services have also been examined as a separate type of service in prior literature. 
Fortin et al. (2008) examined the effects of tax services from the lenders’ perspective 
and found evidence that firms that pay proportionately more tax fees to their audit firm 
are rewarded by bondholders by a lower yield spread. Because in a competitive debt 
market borrowing costs are connected to audit quality, this would imply that providing 
tax services increases the reliability of financial reporting. When considering all non-
audit services however, Brandon et al. (2004) could not validate that the amount of non-
audit fees has an effect on actual bond ratings assigned to a debt issue by rating 
analysts. The effect on yield spread found by Fortin et al. (2008) was stronger in firms 
experiencing worse information asymmetry. These firms include e.g. banks and 
insurance firms, who are not as transparent to financiers as other firms are and whose 
risks are harder to assess (Morgan, 2002). 
The decision to separate tax services from other non-audit services has hence been 
supported by the research from the lenders’ perspective. Tax services have been found 
to have a positive connection to debt pricing, while for non-audit services as a whole the 
debate goes on as to whether they have a negative connection or none whatsoever. 
However, even though tax services have been found to lower borrowing costs, one 
cannot jump to the conclusion that they would not impair auditor independence from the 
lenders’ perspective. 
In fact, in their study Fortin et al. (2008) assume that tax services have a negative effect 
on the bondholders’ perception of auditor independence. In their conclusions they point 
out the balance between impaired auditor independence and the benefit of learning more 
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about the audit client through the provision tax services. In the case of auditor-provided 
tax services, the results indicate that the positive impact of tax services on improving 
auditor competence dominates the concurrent negative impact on auditor independence 
in shaping bondholder perceptions. 
 
2.2 Non-audit Services’ Effect on Audit Quality and Efficiency 
2.2.1 Non-Audit Services’ Effect on Audit Quality  
The aforementioned balance between possible benefits in improved audit quality and on 
the other hand impaired auditor independence has an important role in the examination 
of the effects of tax services. In the previously introduced literature on independence in 
appearance the effects of tax services could not be clearly separated from the effects of 
the other non-audit services. Taking the possibly improved audit quality through the 
better knowledge of the client into consideration introduces a new factor into the 
question, and many of the arguments supporting the special treatment of tax services are 
based on this research. 
The study of the effects of non-audit services on audit quality stem from observations 
made by Simunic (1984), which indicated that performing non-audit services increases 
audit quality because of a beneficial knowledge spillover between services. His study 
deals with non-audit services as a whole, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions 
about the effects of tax services. If information received from different service types is 
assumed to be equal, the positive effect of non-audit services on audit quality also 
relates to tax services. On the other hand, it might be that different services provide the 
auditor with different amounts of information that is valuable for the audit. In this case 
examining the total benefit does not reveal the contribution of tax services. The total 
benefit has also been studied by Krishnan et al. (2005), who contradictory to previous 
results found no evidence supporting the idea that purchasing non-audit services 
enhances audit quality and could therefore result in a higher earnings response 
coefficient. 
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Some evidence suggests that there are differences between the effects of specific service 
types. Kinney et al. (2004) approached audit and financial reporting quality by 
examining the connection between non-audit services and restatements of previously 
issued financial statements. They found a significant negative association between tax 
services and restatements, implying that the possible economic dependence of an audit 
firm on a client is more than compensated by the resulting reporting quality benefits. 
Additionally, tax services have been found to improve earnings quality by curtailing 
aggressive accounting practices and diminishing the book-tax difference (Choi, 2009). 
When balancing the impaired independence resulting from non-audit services with the 
benefits of having better knowledge of the audit client, in the case of tax services the 
quality benefits seem to outweigh the independence concerns. In the case of other 
services, the results indicate a positive association between non-audit fees and 
restatements consistent with the view that at least for some non-audit services the 
negative effects on auditor independence offset the quality enhancements. (Kinney, 
2004) 
One possible explanation for the special status of tax services when it comes to audit 
quality effects through knowledge spillovers might be that especially firms with high 
tax and operational complexity use these services (Lassila et al. 2010). In such cases, 
the information gathered while performing the services is more likely to be vital while 
conducting the audit. In addition, the strength of a company’s corporate governance was 
found to have a similar effect on the benefits from knowledge spillover. Firms with 
strong governance structures were less concerned about perceptions of impaired 
independence and could instead maximize the benefits of the information gathered in 
the performance of tax services. 
The connection between tax services and firms with high operational and tax 
complexity might also explain the previously introduced research result that tax services 
seem to lower borrowing costs especially in firms with higher information asymmetries 
(Fortin et al. 2008). In firms with complex operational and tax structures the 
information gathered during the provision of tax services could, according to Lassila et 
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al. (2010), have an especially strong effect on audit quality. The increased audit quality 
would, according to Fortin et al. (2008), manifest itself in increased financial reporting 
reliability and lower borrowing costs. Therefore at least from the lenders’ perspective, 
the beneficial knowledge spillovers from tax services in for example investment firms 
are perceived to outweigh the risk of impaired auditor independence. 
Another scenario, in addition to high operational and tax complexity, where the 
information spillover from tax services could be especially beneficial, develops in 
poorly performing firms. Robinson (2008) studied the likelihood of an auditor to issue a 
going-concern opinion in the last audit report prior to the firm filing for bankruptcy. He 
documents a significant and positive relation between the level of tax service fees and 
the likelihood of issuing a correct opinion in the last audit report. In addition to the fact 
that tax services can have a direct effect on income through the maximization of taxable 
losses resulting in tax refunds, the information received from the services is also 
beneficial in the assessment of the firm’s going-concern risk. Therefore poorly-
performing firms might have an enhanced need for at least some types of tax services. 
(Goldman, 2006) 
As prior research suggests that poorly-performing firms are more likely to use tax 
services than others, interpreting Robinson’s (2008) results becomes more difficult. The 
amount of tax service fees was found to be positively correlated with correctly issuing a 
going-concern opinion. If however the likelihood of hiring tax services increases as the 
firm’s financial distress grows stronger, one reason behind the relation might be that the 
firms paying more tax fees were also the ones having clearly noticeable problems. In 
this scenario the interpretation of the tax services’ effect on audit quality is not that 
straight forward. In general one could say that balancing between effects on audit 
quality and risks of impaired auditor independence is questionable, since it is 
challenging to objectively measure the amount of information transferred and the effects 
that non-audit services have on independence. 
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2.2.2 Non-audit Services’ Effect on Audit Efficiency  
In the previously introduced studies the effects of non-audit services on audit quality 
were compared to the effects on the demand for independence stemming from agency 
theory. In addition to this, the effects of auditor-provided non-audit services can also be 
examined from the perspective of the Audit Risk Model. Research results indicate that 
providing non-audit services can be beneficial in the audit risk assessment (Joe et al. 
2007). According to the audit risk model this would allow the auditor to better plan the 
nature and extent of his tests thus resulting in a more effective audit. 
The amount of tax and accounting related non-audit services have been found to 
increase the amount of audit hours (Davis, 1993). These results could be interpreted in 
different ways. They could be seen to support the claim that the non-audit services in 
question do not compromise auditor independence but increase audit effort (Schneider 
et al. 2006). On the other hand they could also be seen to indicate that providing non-
audit services does not lead to knowledge spillovers beneficial for audit efficiency 
(Davis, 1993). Commonly the results have been seen to provide evidence that the 
provision of non-audit services does not create circumstances in which auditor 
independence is jeopardized. This could be seen as a justification for the special status 
of tax services, were it not for the fact that Davis’ results also include accounting-
related services which are specifically prohibited in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
The study of audit effort measured in audit hours and its relation to the provision of 
non-audit services included all non-audit services. The special link between tax services 
and increased audit hours does not necessarily suggest anything about the quality and 
efficiency of the audit, when recent studies suggest that especially firms with high tax 
and operational complexity are the ones using these services (Lassila et al. 2010). In 
these circumstances it might only be natural that auditing these firms requires a larger 
amount of audit hours. 
Examining the effects of non-audit services on audit efficiency, as suggested by the 
audit risk model, is also complicated by the fact that one has to try to quantify how 
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knowledge spillovers from the services affect the auditor’s risk assessment. Wu (2006) 
points out that finding empirical evidence for these spillovers is difficult. All in all, 
prior research findings do not offer a clear picture on the effects of non-audit services as 
a whole on the auditor’s effort choice. The same difficulties relating to measurements 
and interpretations of prior academic research results also apply to the research on tax 
services. 
 
2.3 Non-Audit Services’ Effect on Independence of Mind 
When examining the effects of non-audit services on audit efficiency and quality, prior 
research has aimed to consider both auditor independence in appearance as well as 
independence of mind by for example studying the effects of non-audit services on audit 
effort. This perspective however still often includes a third party, because one was 
balancing the benefits of knowledge transfers from the services with the risk of 
impaired auditor independence, which was often based on the perceptions of financial 
statement users or managers. In the research on auditor independence of mind especially 
the length of auditor tenure as well as the magnitude of discretionary accruals has been 
examined in prior research. 
 
2.3.1 Non-Audit Services and Auditor Tenure 
One association examined in the study of auditor independence of mind is the one 
between non-audit services and auditor tenure. An auditor might be inclined to 
compromise his judgment and sway towards the client’s position in order to ensure 
future non-audit fees and keep up the existing relationship with the client (Schneider et 
al. 2006). Thus the research focuses on the combined effects of non-audit fees and 
auditor tenure. 
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Iyer et al.’s (2004) survey however suggests that in fact, client company respondents 
(such as controllers and CEO’s) in companies with short audit tenures were more likely 
to perceive that they can persuade the auditor to accept their position in disagreements. 
This perception was also shared by companies, who believed to be vital clients to the 
audit partner. The purchase of non-audit services however did not affect the 
respondents’ belief in their ability to persuade the auditor. 
The previously mentioned study was conducted from the client’s perspective, which 
makes interpreting the results from the perspective of auditor independence of mind 
troublesome. Approaching the issue more from the auditor’s perspective, Johnson et al. 
(2002) find evidence suggesting that short relationships between audit firms and audit 
clients are associated with higher levels of unexpected accruals. This evidence also 
contradicts the assertion that longer tenure is associated with jeopardized auditor 
independence. 
In the research on tax services, auditor tenure has often not been taken into 
consideration. Omer et al. (2006) studied changes in the amount of auditor-provided tax 
services from 2000 to 2002, when the possible prohibition of the services was 
speculated. Their results indicate that auditor-provided tax services were reduced in 
short-tenure clients. Services provided by longer-tenure auditors on the other hand were 
maintained, even though the regulatory environment and atmosphere was against it. 
These results seem to speak in favor of the special status of tax services, since previous 
literature associates tax services with higher financial reporting quality (Kinney, 2004) 
and longer tenures with higher earnings quality (Myers et al. 2003). The results of Omer 
et al. (2006) can thus be seen to suggest that the main drivers behind the longer joined 
audit/tax service provision were reporting and audit quality, instead of the possibility of 
being able to buy the auditor’s acquiescence. 
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2.3.2 Magnitude of Discretionary Accruals and Tax Avoidance 
Another branch of auditor-provided non-audit service –research focuses on the question 
whether the provision of non-audit services affects the auditor’s objectivity in the 
assessment of the magnitude of discretionary accruals and their effect on management 
meeting its earnings targets. This is based on the idea that if an auditor does not actively 
restrict opportunistic earnings management, his/her independence could be seen to be 
impaired (Alaoutinen, 2010). Frankel et al. (2002) found a positive association between 
non-audit fees and the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals indicating increased 
earnings management. Audit fees on the other hand were found to have the opposite 
effect. Interestingly, combining non-audit fees with audit fees masked these opposite 
effects and no association could be found between total fees and earnings management.  
Reynolds et al. (2004) also report a positive connection between non-audit fees and 
discretionary accruals. However, they also come to the conclusion that this result is 
mainly due to sample choice. The sample included high-growth firms, whose rapid 
growth explains the high fluctuations in the level of accruals relative to their industry, in 
addition to creating a sudden increase in the need for valuation and other external 
accounting services not classified as audit services. Chung and Kallapur (2003) come to 
the same conclusion by controlling for industry effects. Their results suggest no 
significant relationship between nondiscretionary accruals and the ratio of non-audit to 
audit fees. When modifying Frankel et al.’s (2002) research with an adjustment for firm 
performance, the results also indicate no evidence that auditors impair their 
independence by offering more non-audit services (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). 
Previous research has been criticized for not considering the endogeneity of audit-fees, 
non-audit fees and abnormal accruals. For instance, prior results imply that many of 
these variables are related to the same factors, such as firm performance in Ashbaugh’s 
(2003) case. By accounting for these interdependencies Antle et al. (2006) find no 
evidence supporting the claim that fees for non-audit services increase abnormal 
accruals, instead their results indicate the exact opposite. They conclude that this result 
might be explained by the knowledge spillover effect. 
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In prior literature tax services have been dealt with as a part of other non-audit services 
and all in all, the research results vary. Therefore one cannot even conclude that offering 
non-audit services impairs auditor independence in a way that is visible in the increased 
use of discretionary accruals in meeting management earnings targets. When examining 
tax services however, one has to consider the additional factor that the use of earnings 
management in this context could also mean managing taxable income in addition to 
book income. In the US, where book-tax conformity is low, managers could pursue high 
book income and low taxable income simultaneously (Choi et al. 2009). 
Choi et al. (2009) found that the provision of tax services is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals and that it diminishes the book-tax difference. This again was 
found to be a result of knowledge spillovers and an indication of decreased tax 
avoidance. On a general level these results were seen to show that tax services improve 
earnings quality by curtailing opportunistic accounting practices. These results 
contradict the newest restrictions of the SEC, whose main purpose was to restrict 
aggressive interpretations of tax laws and regulations. 
The situation for discretionary accruals and tax avoidance is therefore especially mixed. 
Prior research disagrees on the effect of non-audit services and only partially supports 
the assertion that the provision of auditor-provided non-audit services impairs auditor 
independence. On the other hand according to the latest studies, both non-audit services 
as a whole as well as tax services separately decrease opportunistic accounting practices 
and earnings management, but legislators have nonetheless restricted both service types. 
 
2.4 Summary 
In the literature review, I illustrated the special status of tax services in the study of 
auditor-provided non-audit services and relating regulations. My approach utilized the 
perspectives used in the research on all non-audit services in order to provide a thorough 
overall view on the possible effects of tax services and to create a wide reference base. 
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Overall, prior studies do not agree whether tax consulting impairs auditor independence 
in appearance and independence of mind. Many studies, however, agree that it does 
improve audit quality, which would support the services’ special status in SOX. From 
the perspective of agency theory and financial statement users, some studies suggest 
that all non-audit services are perceived to have a negative effect on auditor 
independence in appearance, regardless of service type and possible academic findings. 
The effects relating to independence of mind with specific regard to discretionary 
accruals are especially unclear, since research findings regarding both all non-audit 
services and tax services individually are mixed and partially contradict the legislators’ 
view. In this branch of research non-audit services have also often been grouped 
together. This is questionable since, as was also the case in the influence on 
restatements i.e. audit quality, the effects of individual service types can vary. In the 
following empirical sections of this study I try to shed some light on this situation by 
separately re-examining the effects of non-audit services and tax services on auditor 
independence of mind measured in discretionary accruals. 
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3) Research Method and Hypotheses 
I approach the research question with a quantitative method that tests hypotheses based 
on previous research introduced in the literature review and particularly in chapter 2.4.2. 
Following the same reasoning as in prior research, I use discretionary accruals as a 
measure of auditor-allowed earnings management, and thus also as a proxy for auditor 
independence. The question of whether non-audit and tax services affect auditor 
independence is approached by examining the fees paid for these services. Using 
auditor fees in the analysis of auditor independence is based on a concept introduced by 
Simunic (1984) called “economic bonding”, according to which the joint performance 
of audit and non-audit services makes the auditor less likely to object to earnings 
management, since being dismissed as an auditor would most likely also mean losing 
future revenues from non-audit services. The concept of economic bonding is based on 
economies of scope, which exist when one service has a positive effect on the other. For 
example, performing non-audit services could help reduce audit costs because of 
knowledge spillovers, meaning that the auditor is already familiar with the client’s 
systems. These effects therefore help to create an economic bond between the auditor 
and client. (Antle et al. 2006) 
The theories explaining auditor bias, which can lead to auditor-allowed earnings 
management in the form of higher discretionary accruals, are often divided into the ones 
stemming from agency literature and the ones based more strongly on behavioral 
theories (see for example Frankel et al. 2002 and Antle et al. 2006). Agency theory 
builds on information asymmetry and the conflicting interests of two parties. Therefore 
by definition, in agency literature one assumes a conflict between management and the 
shareholders which, according to Firth (1997), leads to a situation where shareholders 
need to be concerned about the auditor safeguarding their interests. In doing so, they 
rely on signals of auditor independence, such as regulatory oversight and auditor 
reputation. When independence is jeopardized through for example economic bonding, 
the auditor deliberately agrees with management’s representations and interpretations in 
accounting matters. The agency theory -approach to auditor bias therefore assumes that 
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the cause of auditor bias is an intentional choice to distort the auditor-approved financial 
reports in favor of the managements’ interests (Frankel et al. 2002).  
Behavioral literature takes a different approach to the cause of auditor bias. 
Psychological research such as for example a study conducted by Moore et al. (2002) 
suggests that biased information processing is not a choice but a pervasive, unconscious 
as well as an unintentional choice. The pervasiveness implies that auditors facing 
conflicts of interests in most cases do not have the option of avoiding bias, even if they 
are actively trying to do so. In their experiments demonstrating bias in auditors’ 
judgments, they come to a somewhat disturbing conclusion for investors, lenders, 
shareholders and other stakeholders relying on independent auditing: it might not be 
enough to consciously counteract potential bias, because auditors may simply be 
incapable of doing so. They connect their conclusions to a concept called partisanship, 
where one already by affiliation becomes biased to support for example a specific 
group, and conclude that the only way to eliminate conflicts of interests is to prevent 
these partisan allegiances from forming between an auditor and his audit client. 
The empirical approach of this study focuses on the independence of mind –aspect 
introduced in the literature review. The general approaches in empirical research on 
non-audit services are illustrated in Figure 2. As is also evident from the literature 
review, prior research on non-audit services focuses on their effects on different 
measures of audit quality, which again can be affected by auditor independence 
concerns, or knowledge spillovers that affect auditor competence. The empirical 
approach of this paper focuses on the effects of auditor-provided non-audit services on 
audit quality measured in earnings management. The methods used therefore aim to 
capture the effects of economic bonding on auditor independence, instead of measuring 
knowledge spillovers. 
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Figure 2 Empirical Approaches to the Effects of Non-audit Services on Audit Quality 
As mentioned previously, some prior research provides evidence supporting the idea 
that non-audit fees increase earnings management, while others reach the exact opposite 
conclusion. Tax services have also not been separately examined in these studies, even 
though results indicate that there are differences between the effects of different auditor-
provided services when it comes to earnings management and audit quality. Because of 
these mixed research results of prior studies, the hypotheses in this study are subjected 
to two-tailed tests, since no clear direction of effects can be assumed. Building on 
arguments presented in the literature review and this section, my research hypotheses in 
null form are as follows: 
H01: Auditor-provided non-audit services are not associated with earnings management 
H02: Auditor-provided tax services are not associated with earnings management 
H03: Audit services are not associated with earnings management 
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4) Data Description and Research Design 
4.1 Data Description 
The initial sample is retrieved from the COMPUSTAT -database consisting of North 
American Annual Data. The search for financial statements with data dates between 
January 2009 and January 2011 yields 18 538 observations for various firm years i.e. 
roughly 9269 individual firms in total. First I modify the data to represent individual 
firms by combining firm years into one company specific observation. All statements of 
financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6799) are excluded from the sample, because 
estimating discretionary accruals for these companies would require unique procedures 
(Frankel et al. 2002). Excluding also companies for which estimating discretionary 
accruals for the financial year 2010 with the approach introduced in chapter 4.2 (please 
see equation number 3 on page 30) is not possible because of missing variables leaves 
one with a sample of 3274 companies from various industries.  
The regression model introduced at the end of chapter 4.2 (please see equation number 
4 on page 31) also sets additional requirements for the sample data.  Observations that 
lack variables needed to apply the model, such as primarily the percent of shares held by 
institutions as reported by the Thomson Reuters database, are excluded from the sample 
reducing its size to 2448 individual companies. Relevant audit fee data for the model is 
retrieved from the Audit Analytics database, and screening out companies with missing 
audit fee information leads to a final sample size of 2415. 
Table 1 summarizes the steps taken in the sample selection process in Panel A and 
describes the distribution of observations by industry in Panel B. After removing 
financial institutions from the sample, nearly half of the sample consists of companies 
from the manufacturing industry division. The second largest division is the service 
industry with a share of 19% of the observations followed by the transportation & 
public utilities division with a share of 12%. 
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TABLE 1 Sample Selection Process and Sample Firm Distribution by Industry 
 
This table reports the sample selection process in Panel A and the distribution of the sample firms by industry in Panel B. 
 
 
      Panel A: Sample Selection Process 
     
       Selection Criteria 
    
Observations
 
       Financial Statements with Data Dates 1/09 - 1/2011 in COMPUSTAT 18538
 Less: 
          Modification into Firm-Specific Observations 
   
(8601)
     Statements of Financial Institutions (SIC codes 60-67) 
  
(3721) 
     Statements with Missing Data for Discretionary Accrual Estimation (2942) 
     Statements with Ownership Data Not Available in Thomson Reuters (826) 
     Statements with Audit Fee Data Not Available in Audit Analytics (33) 
 
     
  
 Final Sample Size 
    
2415 
 
       
       Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry 
     
       Industry Description 
 
n % 
 
SIC codes
 
       Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
 
14 0,6 %
 
01-09
 Mining 
 
169 7,0 % 
 
10-14 
 Construction 
 
31 1,3 % 
 
15-17 
 Manufacturing 
 
1201 49,7 % 
 
20-39 
 Transportation & Public Utilities 
 
299 12,4 % 
 
40-49 
 Wholesale Trade 
 
84 3,5 % 
 
50-51 
 Retail Trade 
 
151 6,3 % 
 
52-59 
 Services 
 
462 19,1 % 
 
70-89 
 Public Administration 
 
4 0,2 % 
 
91-99 
 
  
    
   Total 
 
2415 100,0 % 
             
Table 1 Sample Selection Process and Sample Firm Distribution by Industry 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates that 73% of the sample companies are audit clients of Big 4 audit 
firms and that Ernst & Young is the largest service provider in this sample, providing 
audit and non-audit services to 24% of the sample companies. The table also shows the 
distribution of non-audit, audit and total fees by auditor, where audit firms with less 
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than 10 clients have been grouped together. It is noticeable that big 4 audit firms receive 
an overwhelming 95% of the total fees in this sample and that their share of the non-
audit fees is an even stronger 97%. Additionally, even though Ernst & Young has the 
largest clientele in the sample, PricewaterhouseCoopers still receives a slightly larger 
share of the total fees. This seems to be largely due to their nearly 11 percentage point 
higher share of billed non-audit services. 
 
                    
TABLE 2 Distribution of Audit Clients, Non-Audit Fees, Audit Fees and Total Fees by Auditor 
 This table reports the distribution of audit clients, non-audit fees, audit fees and total fees by auditor. All the reported 
information is from the financial year 2010. 
 
          Auditor Name 
 
n % 
 
Non-Audit Fees Audit Fees Total Fees 
 
          Ernst & Young  
 
580 24,0 % 
 
26,8 % 26,6 % 26,7 %
 PricewaterhouseCoopers  458 19,0 % 
 
37,6 % 30,1 % 31,6 % 
 Deloitte & Touche  387 16,0 % 
 
20,9 % 21,6 % 21,5 % 
 KPMG  
 
346 14,3 % 
 
12,0 % 16,6 % 15,7 % 
     Big 4 Total 
 
1771 73,3 % 
 
97,3 % 94,9 % 95,4 % 
 
          Grant Thornton  
 
132 5,5 % 
 
0,7 % 1,7 % 1,5 %
 BDO USA  
 
75 3,1 % 
 
0,5 % 1,1 % 1,0 % 
 McGladrey & Pullen  41 1,7 % 
 
0,4 % 0,3 % 0,3 % 
 Moss Adams  
 
18 0,7 % 
 
0,1 % 0,1 % 0,1 % 
 Hein & Associates  18 0,7 % 
 
0,0 % 0,1 % 0,1 % 
 Marcum  
 
17 0,7 % 
 
0,1 % 0,1 % 0,1 % 
 Burr Pilger Mayer Inc  12 0,5 % 
 
0,0 % 0,1 % 0,1 % 
 EisnerAmper  
 
12 0,5 % 
 
0,1 % 0,1 % 0,1 % 
 JH Cohn  
 
11 0,5 % 
 
0,0 % 0,1 % 0,1 % 
 UHY  
  
11 0,5 % 
 
0,0 % 0,1 % 0,1 % 
 Other Auditors with n<10 297 12,3 % 
 
0,8 % 1,4 % 1,2 % 
     Non-Big 4 Total 
 
644 26,7 % 
 
2,7 % 5,1 % 4,6 % 
 
   
    
 
      
 Total 
  
2415 100 % 
 
100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0 % 
                 
Table 2 Distribution of Audit Clients, Non-Audit Fees, Audit Fees and Total Fees by Auditor 
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Table 3 shows the fee amounts by auditor in Panel A as well as the fee compositions by 
auditor in Panel B. Panel B reveals that 20% of the fees paid to big 4 auditors were non-
audit fees whereas for non-big 4 auditors the corresponding share is 12%. Examining 
the non-audit fees with respect to auditor grouping shows that 46% of the non-audit fees 
paid to non-big 4 auditors in the sample are tax fees whereas in the case of big 4 
auditors the proportion is a noticeably higher 56%. In fact, also 56% of the total non-
audit fees in the sample are reported in the tax fee category, which highlights their 
economic importance and accordingly also the need to analyze their effects individually. 
 
      
 
          
TABLE 3 Total Fees, Non-Audit Fees, Audit Fees and Fee Composition by Auditor 
 
This table reports auditor-specific total fees, non-audit fees and audit fees in Panel A, auditor-specific total fee and non-audit 
fee compositions in Panel B as well as big 4 auditor median fee ratios to total fees or to total non-audit fees in Panel C. All 
reported fee information is from the financial year 2010. 
         
Panel A: Auditor Total Fees, Non-Audit Fees and Audit Fees (USD, thousands) 
  
         
      
Total Fees Divided into: 
 Auditor Name 
  
Total Fees
 
Non-Audit Fees Audit Fees 
 
         Ernst & Young 
  
1 677 705
 
333 485 1 344 220
 PricewaterhouseCoopers  
 
1 985 320 
 
466 821 1 518 499 
 Deloitte & Touche  
 
1 349 499 
 
259 528 1 089 971 
 KPMG  
  
988 325 
 
149 748 838 577 
     Big 4 Total 
  
6 000 849 
 
1 209 582 4 791 267 
 
         Grant Thornton  
  
94 442 
 
8 778 85 664 
 BDO USA  
  
60 044 
 
6 372 53 673 
 McGladrey & Pullen 
 
18 732 
 
4 399 14 333 
 Moss Adams 
  
7 455 
 
1 042 6 413 
 Hein & Associates 
 
5 028 
 
364 4 665 
 Marcum 
  
8 334 
 
767 7 567 
 Burr Pilger Mayer Inc 
 
5 464 
 
58 5 406 
 EisnerAmper 
  
3 724 
 
623 3 101 
 JH Cohn 
  
3 882 
 
322 3 560 
 UHY 
   
4 280 
 
390 3 890 
 Other Auditors with n<10 
 
78 423 
 
10 220 68 203 
     Non-Big 4 Total 
  
289 808 
 
33 335 256 473 
 
    
  
 
    
 Total 
   
6 290 657 
 
1 242 917 5 047 740 
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Panel B: Auditor Total Fee and Non-Audit Fee Composition  
         
   
Total Fees Divided into: 
 
    Non-Audit Fees Divided into: 
 Auditor Name 
 
Non-Audit Fees Audit Fees 
 
Tax Fees Other Fees 
 
         Ernst & Young  
 
19,9 % 80,1 %
 
60,9 % 39,1 %
 PricewaterhouseCoopers  23,5 % 76,5 % 
 
58,6 % 41,4 % 
 Deloitte & Touche  19,2 % 80,8 % 
 
49,9 % 50,1 % 
 KPMG  
 
15,2 % 84,8 % 
 
50,6 % 49,4 % 
     Big 4 Total 
 
20,2 % 79,8 % 
 
56,4 % 43,6 % 
 
         Grant Thornton  
 
9,3 % 90,7 % 
 
42,1 % 57,9 % 
 BDO USA  
 
10,6 % 89,4 % 
 
57,7 % 42,3 % 
 McGladrey & Pullen  23,5 % 76,5 % 
 
34,1 % 65,9 % 
 Moss Adams  
 
14,0 % 86,0 % 
 
66,0 % 34,0 % 
 Hein & Associates  7,2 % 92,8 % 
 
56,1 % 43,9 % 
 Marcum  
 
9,2 % 90,8 % 
 
32,9 % 67,1 % 
 Burr Pilger Mayer Inc  1,1 % 98,9 % 
 
0,0 % 100,0 % 
 EisnerAmper  
 
16,7 % 83,3 % 
 
34,1 % 65,9 % 
 JH Cohn  
 
8,3 % 91,7 % 
 
72,4 % 27,6 % 
 UHY  
  
9,1 % 90,9 % 
 
4,3 % 95,7 % 
 Other Auditors with n<10 13,0 % 87,0 % 
 
46,6 % 53,4 % 
     Non-Big 4 Total 
 
11,5 % 88,5 % 
 
45,7 % 54,3 % 
 
   
    
 
    
 Total 
  
19,8 % 80,2 % 
 
56,1 % 43,9 % 
 
         
Panel C: Big 4 Auditor Median Ratios to Total Fees or Total Non-Audit Fees 
  
         
   
Ratio to Total Fees: 
 
Ratio to Non-Audit Fees: 
 Auditor Name 
 
Non-Audit Fees Audit Fees 
 
Tax Fees Other Fees 
 
         Ernst & Young  
 
0,12 0,88
 
0,68 0,32
 PricewaterhouseCoopers  0,16 0,84 
 
0,66 0,34 
 Deloitte & Touche  0,13 0,87 
 
0,49 0,51 
 KPMG  
 
0,10 0,90 
 
0,52 0,48 
                
Table 3 Total Fees, Non-Audit Fees, Audit Fees and Fee Composition by Auditor 
The economic importance of tax services is also visible in the median of the client-
specific ratios of tax fees to total non-audit fees by auditor in Panel C. For three of the 
big 4 firms in this sample the median ratio exceeds 0,5 indicating that these audit firms 
receive more tax fees than other non-audit fees from at least half of their non-audit 
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service clients. In total, the sample includes 2061 companies that paid fees for auditor-
provided non-audit services in 2010. 
 
4.2 Research Design 
My study uses the approach of Frankel et al (2002) with modifications regarding how 
tax service fees are taken into consideration in the regression model. There has also 
been a change in the audit fee disclosure categories since Frankel et al.’s original study. 
Their data has three disclosure categories: Audit Fees (1), Financial Information 
Systems Design and Implementation Fees (2) and All Other Fees (3). Fees for tax 
services, pension plan audits, due diligence procedures related to mergers and 
acquisitions etc. were at the time defined to be a part of other fees. In their model 
Frankel et al. group the latter two categories together as non-audit fees while the first 
category represents a measure of audit fees. 
The data used in this study however contains 4 categories: Audit Fees (1), Audit-
Related Fees (2), Tax Fees (3), and All Other Fees (4). Fees for tax services, pension 
plan audits and due diligence, which were previously defined as other fees, are now 
defined as tax fees and audit-related fees. To consistently follow Frankel et al.’s (2002) 
approach I therefore group the latter three categories together as non-audit fees while 
the first category again remains a measure of audit fees. 
Additionally, the renewed disclosure categories enable a separate examination of the 
effects of tax service fees on auditor independence. I attempt to analyze these effects by 
disaggregating the tax service fees from other non-audit fees while still following the 
discretionary accrual -approach of Frankel et al (2002). The approach, as well as my 
modifications to it, is described in the following part of this chapter. 
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According to the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model total accruals (TA) are 
equal to:  
TA = net income – cash from operations.        (1) 
Total accruals can however be estimated with the following model at an industry-
specific level, which provides one with industry-specific estimates for coefficients α, β1, 
and β2: 
TAijt/Aijt-1 = α*(1/Aijt-1) + β1*(∆REVijt/Aijt-1) + β2*(PPEijt/Aijt-1) + εijt
            (2) 
Where  Aijt-1= total assets in firm i in industry j for year t-1  
∆REVijt = change in net revenues in firm i in industry j for year t 
PPEijt = gross property plant & equipment in firm i in industry j for year t 
This study examines the financial year 2010 making t in the regression model equal to 
2010. The industry-specific coefficients α, β1, and β2 are estimated by dividing the 
sample into groups based on two-digit SIC codes and estimating the coefficients 
separately for each group. The amount of discretionary accruals (DACC) can then be 
calculated using these coefficient estimates ajt, b1jt and b2jt in the following: 
 
DACC = TAijt/Aijt-1 – [ajt*(1/Aijt-1) + b1jt*((∆REVijt-∆RECijt)/Aijt-1) +     
            b2jt*(PPE/Aijt-1)]           (3) 
Where ∆ RECijt = change in net receivables in firm i in industry j for year t  
The empirical model to examine the association between non-audit services / tax 
services and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) is shown below 
in Equation 4. All regression variables used in the following sections are defined in 
Table 4. The regression model is run 5 times using a different variable or combination 
of variables in the place of FEEVAR in the equation each time. The first three follow 
Frankel et al.’s (2002) approach, with respect to the renewed fee disclosure categories, 
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and the latter two FEEVAR-options aim to additionally disaggregate the effects of tax 
services from all other non-audit services. In addition to the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, the model is also separately run for income increasing (DACC+) 
and income decreasing (DACC-) accruals as the dependent variable.  
ABSDACC  = α + β1*FEEVAR + β2*BIGFOUR + β3*AUDTEN + β4*CFO + 
β5*ABSCFO + β6*ACC + β7*ABSACC + β8*LEVERAGE + 
β9*LITRISK + β10*M/B + β11*LOGMVE + β12*%INST + β13*LOSS + 
β14*FIN/ACQ + ε          (4) 
 
TABLE 4 Regression Variable Definitions 
 
This table defines all dependent (Group A), fee (Group B) and control variables (Group C) used in the following sections. 
        
Group A Dependent Variables 
     
Variable Name 
 
ABSDACC 
Variable Definition 
 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals    
DACC Discretionary accruals 
    
DACC+ Income increasing discretionary accruals 
   
DACC- Income decreasing discretionary accruals 
  
 
Group B 
 
Variable Name 
 
Fee Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
      
FEEVAR 
The fee variable category (FEEVAR) consists of five  fee variable 
combinations: 
   (1) FEERATIO    Ratio of audit-related, tax and other fees to total fees 
 
   (2) RANKNON    Percentile rank of audit-related, tax and other fees, by auditor & 
         RANKAUD    Percentile rank of audit fees, by auditor 
  
   (3) RANKTOT     Percentile rank of total fees, by auditor 
   
   (4) TAXFEERATIO    Ratio of tax fees to total fees 
    
   (5) RANKTAX    Percentile rank of tax fees, by auditor & 
  
         RANKOTH    Percentile rank of audit-related and other fees, by auditor & 
         RANKAUD    Percentile rank of audit fees, by auditor 
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Group C 
 
Variable Name 
 
BIGFOUR 
Control Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
 
1 if the firm’s auditor is a Big 4 firm, and 0 otherwise 
AUDTEN 
Number of years that the auditor has audited the firm’s financial 
statements 
CFO Cash from operations, deflated by average total assets 
 
ABSCFO 
Absolute value of cash from operations deflated by average total 
assets 
ACC 
Total accruals, equal to net income minus cash from operations, 
deflated by average total assets 
ABSACC 
Absolute value of total accruals, equal to net income minus cash from 
operations,  deflated by average total assets 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
   
LITRISK 
1 if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry identified by Francis et 
al. (1994) (SICs 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 7370–7374, 3600–3674, 5200, 
5961), and 0 otherwise 
M/B Market-to-book ratio 
    
LOGMVE Natural log of MVE (Market Value of Equity) 
  
%INST 
Percent of shares held by institutions (as reported by Thomson 
Reuters) 
LOSS 1 if the firm reported a net loss in the year 2010, and 0 otherwise 
FIN/ACQ 
1 if the firm issued securities or acquired another company in the year 
2010, and 0 otherwise 
                
Table 4 Regression Variable Definitions 
 
4.3 Model Specifications 
The model’s primary dependent variable (the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
i.e. ABSDACC) aims to identify earnings management using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals as its proxy (Frankel et al. 2002). As introduced in the literature 
review, the idea behind examining earnings management in this context is the thought 
that an auditor’s independence can be seen to be impaired when he allows opportunistic 
earnings management. 
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The model’s first explanatory variable (FEEVAR) includes 5 different auditor fee 
specifications. In the first regression approach the variable is defined as the ratio of non-
audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO) which prior literature and the SEC suggest to be 
relevant in the assessment of auditor independence. Frankel et al. (2002) point out that 
this ratio is affected by the cross-sectional variation of both non-audit and audit fees and 
that it does not capture the scale of the fees or the economic importance of the client to 
the auditor. The economic importance, in line with the concept of economic bonding, is 
taken into account in the second fee variable (FEEVAR) combination; the client-
specific percentile ranks of non-audit fees and audit fees by auditor (RANKNON and 
RANKAUD). For example, the client that pays the highest (lowest) amount of non-
audit fees to a specific auditor receives a RANKNON value of 100 (1). This fee variable 
specification consists of two parts, enabling a separate analysis of the importance of the 
client as a non-audit and audit service customer, while still mitigating omitted variable 
bias since prior research suggests a positive correlation between audit and non-audit 
fees. The third and final specification of the original study of Frankel et al. (2002) is the 
client-specific percentile rank of total fees by auditor (RANKTOT). This variable is 
again affected by the cross-sectional variation of both audit and non-audit fees and, 
since it is an aggregate measure for both fee categories, assumes similar incentive 
effects. 
The last two fee variables are modifications to the original model. The fourth fee 
variable is defined as the ratio of tax fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO). The ratio is 
subject to the same cross-sectional variations and limitations of measuring economic 
importance as FEERATIO. It aims to measure the proportional amount of tax services 
purchased by each client and thus separating their effect from others. The fifth fee 
variable (FEEVAR) combination is defined as the client-specific percentile ranks of tax 
fees, other non-audit fees and audit fees (RANKTAX, RANKOTH and RANKAUD). 
This again eliminates the variation from the other service categories and captures the 
economic importance of the client with respect to specific service categories. The 
variable consists of three parts in order to enable a clearer disaggregation of effects 
while still mitigating omitted variable bias. 
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Additionally, the model controls for several other factors that might affect the amount 
of discretionary accruals. The findings of for example Francis et al. (1999) suggest that 
big 4 auditors could be less likely to allow earnings management in the form of 
estimated discretionary accruals, suggesting that these auditors might be more active in 
constraining opportunistic accrual reporting. Prior literature also suggests a possible 
association between long audit tenures and diminished auditor independence (Schneider 
et al. 2006). These factors are controlled for in the model with a dummy variable equal 
to 1 when the auditor is a big 4 firm (BIGFOUR) and with a variable measuring the 
number of years the audit firm has been auditing the company’s financial statements 
(AUDTEN). Prior research also suggests that discretionary accruals are associated with 
leverage and firm performance. Therefore the model also includes the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets (LEVERAGE) and the following measures of firm performance 
which are all deflated by total assets: cash from operations (CFO), the absolute value of 
cash from operations (ABSCFO), total accruals (ACC) as well as the absolute value of 
total accruals (ABSACC). (Frankel et al. 2002) 
Another factor connected to the amount of discretionary accruals is management’s need 
to meet earnings benchmarks, and therefore their incentives to manage earnings. These 
incentives have found to be stronger in firms with high litigation risk, growth 
expectations and institutional ownership. The model takes these factors into account 
with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company operates in a high-litigation-risk 
industry (LITRISK), a variable measuring growth prospects through the company’s 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) and with a variable defined as the percentage of shares held 
by institutions (%INST) as reported by Thomson Reuters. Incentives for earnings 
management also arise when a company reports losses. This factor is controlled in the 
model by a dummy variable (LOSS) equal to 1 if a company reported a loss in 2010. 
(Frankel et al. 2002) 
The model controls for firm size with the natural log of the market value of equity 
(LOGMVE). Additionally, since acquisition activities have been found to be connected 
to the amount of non-audit fees, the model includes a dummy variable (FIN/ACQ) equal 
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to 1 if the firm issued securities or made an acquisition during 2010 as reported by 
COMPUSTAT. (Frankel et al. 2002) 
Frankel et al.’s (2002) model finally includes an additional measure of firm 
performance defined as the percentage compounded monthly return for the year 
examined adjusted for the CRSP value-weighted market index. However, because of 
unavailable data, this additional measure is left out of the model in this study. 
Like any other research model, the approach chosen in this study is subject to some 
limitations and possible criticism. One argument recently brought up in a working paper 
by Coulton et al. (2012) is that the association between accounting quality (measured by 
e.g. unexpected accruals) and audit fees cannot be reliably captured by single-period 
models such as this one, because fee amounts from different years are not independent. 
In their study, they show that single- and multi-period models can lead to opposite 
conclusions about the effect of fees on accounting quality and therefore also auditor 
independence. Another problem arises from using ratios such as FEERATIO and 
TAXFEERATIO. Antle et al. (2006) show that using a ratio of non-audit fees to audit 
fees masks the opposite effects of the individual components. Conclusions from the 
coefficients of feeratio –variables might therefore leave room for interpretation. 
 
4.4 Expected Results 
Frankel et al. (2002) found statistically significant positive coefficients for the ratio of 
non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO) and the economic importance of a non-audit 
service client to an auditor (RANKNON), while on the other hand the coefficient for 
RANKAUD measuring the economic importance of an audit service client was 
significantly negative. The total economic importance of a client (RANKTOT) had a 
positive coefficient, which was not statistically significant. Therefore their findings 
suggests that as the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees increases, or when an audit client 
becomes a vital income source through the provision of non-audit services, also the 
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proxy for impaired auditor independence increases. In contrast to this effect, when the 
audit client is an important income source through the provision of audit services, the 
use of discretionary accruals decreases. Additionally, their results on RANKTOT show 
how combining the variables into a single measure hides these differing effects. 
The problem with interpreting such aggregate effects is the foundation of this study. In 
Frankel et al.’s (2002) research tax fees were not examined separately but included in 
the category non-audit fees. My approach to use three variables measuring the effects of 
tax services (RANKTAX), other non-audit services (RANKOTH) and audit services 
(RANKAUD) as the fee variable (FEEVAR) further disaggregates the effects while 
avoiding omitted variable bias. Previous studies point to the expected result that tax fees 
are also associated with discretionary accruals, meaning that the coefficients for 
TAXFREERATIO and RANKTAX should be statistically significant. It would be 
interesting to find negative associations indicating that when the ratio of tax fees to total 
fees, or the economic importance of the client as a tax service customer increases, the 
use of discretionary accruals in return decreases. These results would justify the 
legislator’s decision to provide special treatment for tax services in relation to other 
non-audit services. 
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5) Empirical Tests and Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 contains descriptive statistics on the total sample and reports the results of t-
tests comparing regression variable means when the sample is partitioned into two 
subsamples at the median value of the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO) 
and the ratio of tax fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO). The respective median values 
are 0,110 and 0,038 as is also evident from the table. The large sample size guarantees 
normality of the means around the true population mean due to the central limit 
theorem, making t-tests applicable without checking for the normality of individual 
sample variables. The t-tests indicate that at a significance level of 0,01 firms with an 
above-median FEERATIO are financially more important to their auditors when 
measured in non-audit, total, tax and other non-audit fees (RANKNON, RANKTOT, 
RANKTAX and RANKOTH). Contrary to Frankel et al.’s (2002) findings, the t-test 
failed to reveal a statistically significant difference between the mean values of the 
client’s importance measured in audit fees (RANKAUD), the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABSDACC), cash from operations and the absolute value of 
cash from operations (CFO and ABSCFO), the litigation risk dummy and institutional 
ownership percentage (LITRISK and %INST) in the two subsamples. Additionally the 
results show that above-median firms are more likely to have a big-4 auditor, have 
longer audit tenures and higher market values of equity in addition to being less likely 
to endure a loss and being more likely to engage in financing and acquisition activities. 
Following the same logic to analyze the effects of tax services instead of all non-audit 
services, I also divide the sample at the median value of TAXFEERATIO. This results 
in similar p-values, except that in this case firms with an above-median 
TAXFEERATIO are also found to be economically more important audit-service clients 
to their auditors as measured by RANKAUD. Additionally no statistically significant 
difference between the mean values of FIN/ACQ in the two subsamples can be found. 
This indicates that the null hypothesis of equal probabilities to engage in financing and 
acquisition activities within both subsamples cannot be rejected at a 0,01 significance 
level. 
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TABLE 5 Sample Descriptive Statistics and Comparison of Means for Regression Variables 
 
This table reports total sample descriptive statistics on the regression variables as well as results from their comparison of 
means, when the sample is divided into two subsamples at the median value of the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
(FEERATIO) or at the median value of the ratio of tax service fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO). For variable definitions please 
see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
          
          
 
Total Sample Statistics 
 
p-values of t-test in Comparison of Means 
Variable 
Name 
Mean 
of Total 
Sample 
Median 
of Total 
Sample 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Total 
Sample 
 
Sample 
Divided at 
Median 
FEERATIO 
Mean for 
Above- 
Median 
Firms is: 
 
Sample 
Divided at 
Median 
TAXFEERATIO 
Mean for 
Above- 
Median 
Firms is: 
          ABSDACC 0,354 0,131 1,748
 
0,855 higher 
 
0,237 higher 
FEERATIO 0,145 0,110 0,140 
 
- - 
 
<0,01 higher 
RANKNON 49,149 50,000 32,449 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
RANKAUD 51,680 51,400 31,163 
 
0,072 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
RANKTOT 51,710 51,400 31,150 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
TAXFEERATIO 0,081 0,038 0,104 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
- - 
RANKTAX 44,015 46,200 35,437 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
RANKOTH 45,623 48,900 34,973 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
RANKAUD 51,680 51,400 31,163 
 
0,072 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
BIGFOUR 0,733 1,000 0,442 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
AUDTEN 12,462 8,000 16,640 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
CFO 0,069 0,085 0,226 
 
0,032 higher 
 
0,123 higher 
ABSCFO 0,136 0,098 0,193 
 
0,046 lower 
 
0,590 lower 
ACC -0,086 -0,052 0,901 
 
0,279 higher 
 
0,443 lower 
ABSACC 0,126 0,061 0,896 
 
0,057 lower 
 
0,978 higher 
LEVERAGE 0,666 0,485 5,486 
 
0,359 lower 
 
0,300 higher 
LITRISK 0,313 0,000 0,463 
 
0,397 lower 
 
0,397 higher 
M/B 1,950 2,002 89,125 
 
0,452 lower 
 
0,807 lower 
LOGMVE 6,401 6,466 2,104 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
<0,01 higher 
%INST 0,651 0,646 3,676 
 
0,563 lower 
 
0,700 lower 
LOSS 0,274 0,000 0,446 
 
<0,01 lower 
 
<0,01 lower 
FIN/ACQ 0,243 0,000 0,429 
 
<0,01 higher 
 
0,151 higher 
                    
Table 5 Sample Descriptive Statistics and Comparison of Means for Regression Variables 
Table 6 illustrates correlations between the regression variables with Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal.  The results show 
positive and statistically significant correlations between most of the fee variables. The 
only exception is the coefficient between the ratio of tax fees to total fees 
(TAXFEERATIO) and the economic importance of an audit service client 
(RANKAUD), which is also positive but not significant at a 0,05 level. Supporting the 
findings from the median ratio analysis of tax fees to all non-audit fees in Table 3 Panel 
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C, there is a high and significant correlation between the client’s importance as a tax 
service client and as a non-audit service client (RANKTAX and RANKNON), which 
again illustrates that tax services constitute a large share of the non-audit services 
offered in the sample. In line with prior research (e.g Simunic 1984 and Frankel et al. 
2002) and the concepts of economic bonding and economies of scope, the correlation 
between the client’s importance as a non-audit service client and as an audit service 
client (RANKNON and RANKAUD) is statistically significant and positive. All of the 
fee variables are positively correlated with firm size. Contrary to Frankel et al.’s (2002) 
findings however, none of them are significantly correlated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABSDACC). Therefore the results offer no evidence to support a 
rejection of the null hypotheses H01, H02 and H03. 
ABSDACC however does have a significant negative Pearson’s r with the performance 
measures cash from operations (CFO), total accruals (ACC) and the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity (LOGMVE). Both firm size as well as cash from operations are 
also positively correlated with the fee variables, which illustrates quite well how the 
variables in discretionary accrual analyses are often related to the same factors, as 
pointed out by Antle et al. (2006). Examining correlations of ABSDACC with the 
ordinal scale variables reveals a statistically significant negative Spearman’s rho for 
BIGFOUR and FIN/ACQ, indicating a connection between lower discretionary accruals 
and having a big 4 auditor as well as financing and acquisition activity. 
The table shows a strong negative correlation (Pearson’s r of -0,934) between 
LEVERAGE and ACC and accordingly also a strong positive correlation (Pearson’s r of 
0,938) between LEVERAGE and the absolute value of total accruals (ABSACC). This 
suggests a possible case of multicollinearity within the model, which could lead to 
unreliable coefficient estimates with high standard errors for these variables. However, 
since the coefficients of these control variables are not of primary interest in the 
regression analysis, and the fee variables of interest are not highly correlated with any 
of the control variables (the highest Pearson’s r is 0,44), this should not be problematic 
for the reliability of fee variable coefficient estimates. An examination of their variance 
inflation factors (VIF) is however called for to make sure this is actually the case. 
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TABLE 6 Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix for Regression Variables 
 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the main regression model’s variables: Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are reported below (above) the diagonal. For variable definitions please 
see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
 
ABS-
DACC 
FEE-
RATIO 
RANK-
NON 
RANK-
AUD 
RANK-
TOT 
TAXFEE-
RATIO 
RANK-
OTH 
RANK-
TAX 
BIG-
FOUR 
AUD-
TEN CFO 
ABS-
CFO ACC 
ABS-
ACC 
LEVE-
RAGE M/B 
LOG-
MVE %INST LOSS 
FIN/ 
ACQ 
 ABSDACC 
 
,017 ,014 ,019 ,023 ,019 ,000 ,023 -,075** -,036 -0,01 ,100** -0,01 ,166** 0,009 -,002 -,116** -,083** ,042* -,090** 
 FEERATIO ,007 
 
,781** ,073** ,208** ,743** ,571** ,668** ,208** ,159** ,079** ,002 ,041* -,083** ,073** ,063** ,227** ,165** -,116** ,128** 
 RANKNON ,003 ,695** 
 
,474** ,579** ,570** ,741** ,729** ,017 ,111** ,077** -,039 ,073** -,120** ,129** ,042* ,335** ,162** -,153** ,144** 
 RANKAUD ,010 ,042* ,474** 
 
,974** ,071** ,397** ,341** -,099** ,070** ,072** -,086** ,093** -,154** ,196** -,010 ,436** ,188** -,175** ,136** 
 RANKTOT ,012 ,201** ,580** ,974** 
 
,157** ,469** ,413** -,100** ,068** ,075** -,079** ,090** -,153** ,197** -,004 ,437** ,189** -,175** ,154** 
 TAXFEE-
RATIO 
,011 ,704** ,501** ,027 ,132** 
 
,141** ,884** ,262** ,218** ,095** ,019 ,030 -,083** ,057** ,072** ,227** ,202** -,121** ,039 
 
RANKOTH -,012 ,501** ,734** ,391** ,462** ,071** 
 
,302** ,074** ,123** ,060** -,042* ,060** -,109** ,143** ,051* ,344** ,173** -,118** ,181** 
 RANKTAX ,009 ,572** ,725** ,334** ,406** ,718** ,298** 
 
,144** ,185** ,085** -,020 ,060** -,112** ,099** ,050* ,313** ,202** -,146** ,075** 
 BIGFOUR -,036 ,143** ,025 -,092** -,093** ,180** ,093** ,161** 
 
,533** ,164** ,024 -,004 -,113** ,187** ,153** ,578** ,506** -,175** ,134** 
 AUDTEN -,022 ,087** ,155** ,163** ,161** ,106** ,176** ,171** ,335** 
 
,178** ,061** ,022 -,133** ,108** ,117** ,462** ,396** -,212** ,087** 
 CFO -,273** ,046* ,092** ,093** ,092** ,058** ,093** ,072** ,140** ,079** 
 
,646** -,295** ,153** -,080** ,229** ,351** ,279** -,521** ,000 
 ABSCFO ,402** -,034 -,066** -,117** -,114** -,032 -,081** -,064** -,105** -,063** -,432** 
 
-,376** ,347** -,111** ,330** ,140** ,082** -,175** -,105** 
 ACC -,502** ,025 ,045* ,046* ,046* ,015 ,040 ,023 ,051* ,022 ,465** -,578** 
 
-,703** -,119** -,026 ,060** -,001 -,345** ,002 
 ABSACC ,671** -,037 -,065** -,046* -,048* -,027 -,059** -,040* -,086** -,041* -,478** ,576** -,839** 
 
,064** ,027 -,199** -,100** ,294** -,072** 
 LEVERAGE ,599** -,019 -,036 -,028 -,028 -,011 -,032 -,014 -,043* -,009 -,496** ,561** -,934** ,938** 
 
,000 ,182** ,065** ,040* ,084** 
 M/B -,001 ,005 ,013 ,002 ,004 -,008 ,022 ,000 -,013 ,006 -,013 ,018 -,005 ,006 -,002 
 
,327** ,160** -,074** -,011 
 LOGMVE -,041* ,178** ,344** ,442** ,442** ,149** ,360** ,314** ,578** ,391** ,264** -,100** ,095** -,117** -,076** -,004 
 
,610** -,391** ,205** 
 %INST -,010 -,001 ,013 ,007 ,005 -,003 ,030 -,006 ,013 ,007 ,020 -,016 ,005 -,009 -,003 -,013 ,045* 
 
-,296** ,150** 
 LOSS ,055** -,088** -,155** -,177** -,178** -,110** -,121** -,147** -,175** -,185** -,386** ,067** -,108** ,087** ,052* ,033 -,390** -,039 
 
-,069** 
 FIN/ACQ ,003 ,120** ,146** ,140** ,158** ,016 ,182** ,076** ,134** ,057** ,041* -,102** ,019 -,036 -,015 ,005 ,200** ,002 -,069** 
  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
               *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).                               
Table 6 Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix for Regression Variables 
 41 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
Table 7 reports summary statistics on the regression results from all five regressions 
with different fee variable (FEEVAR) combinations. The coefficients of the ratio of 
non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO), the economic importance of a client measured 
in non-audit, audit and total fees (RANKON, RANKAUD and RANKTOT) as well as 
the ratio of tax fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO) are all positive and statistically 
significant at a 0,1 level, but only RANKTOT remains significant even at the 0,01 level. 
The economic importance of a client measured in tax service fees (RANKTAX) and in 
other non-audit fees (RANKOTH) are also positive but statistically insignificant. These 
results are quite different from previous findings of Frankel et al. (2002). The results 
indicate that an increase in the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO) or tax 
fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO) is positively associated with the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals (ABSDACC). The economic importance of a client also has a 
positive association with earnings management, regardless of which services the fees 
are paid for. The findings show that examining the association between individual 
service types and earnings management might lead to misleading conclusions. On a 
0,01 significance level, none of the variables measuring the economic importance of a 
client within an individual service category (RANKNON, RANKAUD, RANKTAX, 
RANKOTH) seem to have a statistically significant association with earnings 
management, whereas the variable measuring the total economic importance of a client 
(RANKTOT) instead shows a significant positive association. 
The adjusted R-squared for all five regression models is approximately 0,47 which is 
nearly identical to the findings of Frankel et al. (2002). Since the models include 
different amounts of explanatory variables, these consistent goodness-of-fit measures 
show that the choice of different fee variables has a similar effect on the model’s 
explanatory power. The chosen fee variables seem to be relevant in the sense that none 
of them has a significantly negative effect on the model’s adjusted R-squared.  
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TABLE 7 Summary of Results from Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports summary statistics from regressions with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable and the sample size equal to 2415. For variable 
definitions please see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
 
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -0,221 0,035 -0,256 0,015 -0,234 0,025 -0,219 0,036 -0,245 0,020 
FEERATIO 0,332 0,080 
        RANKNON 
  
0,002 0,039 
      RANKAUD 
  
0,002 0,067 
      RANKTOT 
    
0,003 < 0,01 
    TAXFEERATIO 
      
0,487 0,057 
  RANKTAX 
        
0,001 0,127 
RANKOTH 
        
0,000 0,771 
RANKAUD 
        
0,002 0,040 
BIGFOUR 0,038 0,605 0,162 0,055 0,161 0,055 0,028 0,701 0,140 0,096 
AUDTEN -0,001 0,721 -0,001 0,577 -0,001 0,629 -0,001 0,690 -0,001 0,579 
CFO 0,568 < 0,01 0,588 < 0,01 0,592 < 0,01 0,566 < 0,01 0,591 < 0,01 
ABSCFO 0,762 < 0,01 0,819 < 0,01 0,829 < 0,01 0,767 < 0,01 0,830 < 0,01 
ACC 0,502 < 0,01 0,502 < 0,01 0,505 < 0,01 0,504 < 0,01 0,504 < 0,01 
ABSACC 1,574 < 0,01 1,582 < 0,01 1,572 < 0,01 1,572 < 0,01 1,576 < 0,01 
LEVERAGE 0,023 0,314 0,022 0,353 0,023 0,317 0,024 0,305 0,023 0,333 
LITRISK -0,106 0,064 -0,090 0,116 -0,091 0,114 -0,109 0,056 -0,093 0,107 
M/B 0,000 0,715 0,000 0,701 0,000 0,718 0,000 0,731 0,000 0,715 
LOGMVE 0,023 0,178 -0,011 0,609 -0,008 0,700 0,025 0,147 -0,008 0,704 
%INST -0,002 0,817 -0,001 0,859 -0,001 0,872 -0,002 0,819 -0,001 0,877 
LOSS 0,198 < 0,01 0,193 < 0,01 0,191 < 0,01 0,203 < 0,01 0,194 < 0,01 
FIN/ACQ 0,109 0,081 0,099 0,113 0,103 0,099 0,120 0,053 0,107 0,089 
Adjusted R2 0,468   0,470   0,469   0,468   0,469   
Table 7 Summary of Results from Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable
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The variables controlling for firm performance (CFO, ABSCFO, ACC, and ABSACC) 
have a statistically significant positive effect on earnings management in all five 
regressions. A significant positive association is also found between the firm reporting a 
loss (LOSS) and the magnitude of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC).  
In order to ensure that the ordinary least square (OLS) regression results are not 
misleading, I test how the data meets some underlying OLS assumptions. The OLS 
estimator has good properties when the following Gauss-Markov conditions are met 
(Verbeek, 2012, p.15): 
E{ εi } = 0,   i = 1,…,N        (5) 
{ε1 ,…, εN} and {x1 ,…, xN} are independent        (6) 
Var{ εi } = σ
2
,  i = 1,…,N        (7) 
Cov{εi, εj} = 0,  i, j = 1,…,N, i ≠ j       (8) 
Equation 5 implies that the mean of the error term is zero. Equation 6 requires that the 
distributions of the observations in x and the distribution of the error terms in ε are 
independent, and finally equations 7 and 8 constitute the assumptions of 
homoscedasticity and no autocorrelation. In the following sections I test the data for 
violations of these assumptions and other problematic aspects that might make the 
regression results unreliable. 
 
Influential Outliers 
 
Since a linear model can be sensitive to a few outliers, I use Cook’s distance to isolate 
influential data points (i.e. observations with a Cook’s distance > 1). Table 8 shows the 
fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates with influential data points removed from 
the analysis. Most fee variable coefficients remain positive and significant at the 0,1 
level, but the outlier-free models lose some of the original models’ explanatory power. 
Another noticeable difference in the fee variables is that the economic importance of a 
client as an audit service customer (RANKAUD) in regression number five becomes 
statistically significant also at the 0,01 level. 
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TABLE 8 Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Outlier-Clean Regressions with the 
Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
This table reports fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates from regressions with the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable and with outliers with a Cook’s Distance > 1 removed from the sample. For 
variable definitions please see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
       
 
Nr. of Outliers 
Removed  
Variable Name Coefficient p-value 
 Regr. 1 3 
 
FEERATIO 0,337 0,072 
 Regr. 2 3 
 
RANKNON 0,002 0,049 
 
   
RANKAUD 0,003 0,012 
 Regr. 3 3 
 
RANKTOT 0,004 <0,01 
 Regr. 4 3 
 
TAXFEERATIO 0,515 0,042 
 Regr. 5 3 
 
RANKTAX 0,010 0,100 
 
   
RANKOTH 0,000 0,842 
 
   
RANKAUD 0,003 <0,01 
               
Table 8 Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Outlier-Clean Regressions with the Absolute Value of 
Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
Normally Distributed Residuals 
 
The presence of outliers suggests that the residuals of the model might not be normally 
distributed. Table 9 reports summary statistics on model’s residuals. Based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed residuals can be rejected at the 0,01 significance level. The OLS coefficient 
estimates however still remain the best linear unbiased estimators of the regression 
coefficients, because the expected value of the error term E {εi} i.e. the residual mean is 
zero in all five regressions. The non-normality however can have a negative effect on 
the reliability of the coefficient estimate p-values, because t-tests require normality. 
This however is compensated by the large sample size used in all five regressions. 
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TABLE 9 Normality and Expected Value of Regression Residuals with the Absolute Value of 
Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the expected values and normality of residuals from regressions with the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable and the sample size equal to 2415.  
         
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnof 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
 
E(εi) Statistic df p-value 
 
Statistic df p-value 
Regr. 1 0,00E+00 0,31 2415 <0,01 
 
0,177 2415 <0,01 
Regr. 2 0,00E+00 0,309 2415 <0,01 
 
0,179 2415 <0,01 
Regr. 3 0,00E+00 0,310 2415 <0,01 
 
0,178 2415 <0,01 
Regr. 4 0,00E+00 0,309 2415 <0,01 
 
0,178 2415 <0,01 
Regr. 5 0,00E+00 0,308 2415 <0,01 
 
0,179 2415 <0,01 
                  
Table 9 Normality and Expected Value of Regression Residuals with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals 
as the Dependent Variable 
Homoskedasticity and Linearity 
 
Figure 3 shows scatter plots of the standardized residuals (y-variable) and the 
standardized predicted values (x-variable). The plots are centered on 0 as is the case 
when the error term has a mean of zero, but they are not randomly distributed around its 
center in a sphere as would be the case with a normally distributed error term. The 
spread of the residuals is quite even throughout the plot suggesting no major violations 
of linearity, but the fact that the scatter patterns have a systematic shape on the lower 
left side might suggest some concern of heteroscedasticity. Additionally, the previously 
found outliers are visible on the right side of the plot. The systematic pattern is most 
likely caused by the non-normally distributed error terms. This is connected to the 
previous conclusion from above: the non-normal distribution of the error term, 
noticeable also in the plot, does not make the coefficient estimates biased, but might 
have a negative impact on the reliance of the t-tests through biased standard errors. 
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               Figure 3 Visual Examination of Possible Heteroscedasticity 
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Multicollinearity and Independence of Residuals 
 
The correlation matrix in Table 6 revealed possible multicollinearity between the 
control variables LEVERAGE, ACC and ABSACC. It however also showed that the fee 
variables of interest did not have strong correlations with any of the control variables. In 
order ensure that the variances of the fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates are 
not affected by multicollinearity issues, I report their variance inflation factors in Table 
10. These factors indicate how much the coefficient estimate variances are inflated by 
collinearity with another variable. When an estimate is not affected by collinearity with 
another regressor, its VIF value is equal to 1. The table shows that the fee variables are 
not subject to multicollinearity problems since all VIF values are below 2 and, as a rule 
of thumb, a value of 5 can be seen as a threshold for possible problems. 
 
Table 10 also shows the Durbin-Watson statistic of the regressions, which is used to 
detect possible autocorrelation. This statistic’s values lie between 0 and 4, where values 
differing from 2 are indicators of autocorrelation. The table shows that the Durbin-
Watson of all five regressions are approximately equal to 2 indicating that there is no 
violation of the fourth Gauss-Markov assumption present in the models. 
 
TABLE 10 Variance Inflation Factors and Durbin-Watson Statistics from Regressions with the 
Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
This table reports variance inflation factors (VIF) of the fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates as well as the Durbin-Watson 
statistics from regressions with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable and the sample 
size equal to 2415. For variable definitions please see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
     
 
Variable Name Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Durbin-Watson 
Regr. 1 FEERATIO 1,045 ≈1 2,004 
Regr. 2 RANKNON 1,347 ≈1 2,000 
 
RANKAUD 1,862 < 2 
 Regr. 3 RANKTOT 1,691 < 2 2,001 
Regr. 4 TAXFEERATIO 1,044 ≈1 1,996 
Regr. 5 RANKTAX 1,219 ≈1 1,997 
 
RANKOTH 1,305 ≈1 
 
 
RANKAUD 1,842 < 2 
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Table 10 Variance Inflation Factors and Durbin-Watson Statistics from Regressions with the Absolute Value of 
Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
 
In summary, examining the underlying assumptions of the ordinary least square 
regression revealed that the model’s fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates 
remain positive even when outliers are removed from the data and that their variances 
are not affected by multicollinearity problems. Because the outliers did not bias the 
FEEVAR coefficient estimates and removing them resulted in loss of explanatory 
power, I will keep using the total sample in further analyses. Additionally, no signs of 
autocorrelation were detected, which is not surprising, given that the model does not use 
time series data. The analysis did, however, reveal that the model results with this 
sample might suffer from heteroscedasticity in addition to a non-normal error term 
distribution, which could lead to unreliable standard error estimators for the coefficient 
estimates, thus affecting the reliability of their p-values.  
I address these problems by also reporting heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error 
estimators and p-values. Frankel et al.’s (2002) results are reported using White’s 
(1980) robust standard error estimates. The estimates used in this study however are 
derived by an algorithm written by Hayes et al. (2007) for IBM SPSS Statistics, which 
computes heteroscedasticity-robust test statistics using the methods defined by 
MackKinnon and White (1985). In their experiments MacKinnon et al. (1985) found 
that their modified version of the heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator outperforms 
the original one from White (1980), in addition to enabling more reliable inferences 
even if there in fact is no heteroscedasticity present and the sample size is small. This is 
why all the following results in this paper will be reported with the robust estimators, 
which should significantly lower the risk of getting unreliable and misleading p-values. 
Table 11 summarizes the ABSDACC regression results with heteroscedasticity 
consistent p-values, while the code used to compute the robust standard error estimators 
and further information on the method can be found in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 11 Summary of Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Results from Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports heteroscedasticity-consistent summary statistics from regressions with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable and the sample size 
equal to 2415. For variable definitions please see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
 
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -0,221 0,231 -0,256 0,183 -0,234 0,207 -0,219 0,2440 -0,245 0,194 
FEERATIO 0,332 0,040 
        RANKNON 
  
0,002 0,017 
      RANKAUD 
  
0,002 0,097 
      RANKTOT 
    
0,003 0,026 
    TAXFEERATIO 
      
0,487 0,239 
  RANKTAX 
        
0,001 0,225 
RANKOTH 
        
0,000 0,796 
RANKAUD 
        
0,002 0,081 
BIGFOUR 0,038 0,060 0,162 0,092 0,161 0,093 0,028 0,689 0,140 0,122 
AUDTEN -0,001 0,624 -0,001 0,466 -0,001 0,516 -0,001 0,595 -0,001 0,579 
CFO 0,568 0,224 0,588 0,213 0,592 0,230 0,566 0,227 0,591 0,461 
ABSCFO 0,762 0,146 0,819 0,130 0,829 0,125 0,767 0,145 0,830 0,212 
ACC 0,502 0,173 0,502 0,170 0,505 0,162 0,504 0,163 0,504 0,166 
ABSACC 1,574 < 0,01 1,582 <0,01 1,572 < 0,01 1,572 < 0,01 1,576 < 0,01 
LEVERAGE 0,023 0,875 0,022 0,890 0,023 0, 883 0,024 0,873 0,023 0,886 
LITRISK -0,106 0,033 -0,090 0,053 -0,091 0,053 -0,109 0,034 -0,093 0,065 
M/B 0,000 0,817 0,000 0,832 0,000 0,823 0,000 0,829 0,000 0,835 
LOGMVE 0,023 0,381 -0,011 0,716 -0,008 0,786 0,025 0,358 -0,008 0,792 
%INST -0,002 0,996 -0,001 0,997 -0,001 0,997 -0,002 0,996 -0,001 0,997 
LOSS 0,198 0,158 0,193 0,164 0,191 0,166 0,203 0,160 0,194 0,171 
FIN/ACQ 0,109 0,226 0,099 0,253 0,103 0,242 0,120 0,197 0,107 0,264 
Adjusted R2 0,468   0,470   0,469   0,468   0,469   
Table 11 Summary of Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Results from Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable
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Since the coefficient estimates were unbiased, the coefficients in Table 11 remain 
identical to the previous approach, still providing no evidence that the effects on 
earnings management and auditor independence would be different for the individual 
fee categories. All fee variables remain positive and the coefficient estimates of the ratio 
of non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO), the client’s economic importance as a non-
audit and audit service client (RANKNON and RANKAUD) as well as in total 
(RANKTOT) are statistically significant at the 0,1 level. From the table it is noticeable 
that robust p-values of the performance measures such as CFO, ABSCFO and ACC are 
no longer significant at the 0,01 level as was consistently the case with the non-robust 
results. The coefficient estimates for the ratio of tax fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO) 
and the economic importance of a client as a tax service customer (RANKTAX) also 
became insignificant at the 0,1 significance level indicating that there is no statistically 
significant association between tax services and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
The positive associations found for FEERATIO, RANKNON, RANKAUD and 
RANKTOT are in line with the conclusions from the non-robust model. It seems that 
the economic importance of a client measured in non-audit (RANKNON), audit 
(RANKAUD) and total fees (RANKTOT) as well as the ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees (FEERATIO) are associated with an increase in earnings management. The fact 
that also RANKAUD has a positive coefficient contradicts the findings of Frankel et al. 
(2002) who found that the economic importance of a client as an audit service customer 
not only restricts, but decreases the use of discretionary accruals in earnings 
management. The opposite findings of this study are in line with the behavioral theory –
approach to auditor bias introduced by Moore et al. (2002). It seems that regardless of 
the context (i.e. type of service) in which the auditor affiliates with the audit client, the 
auditor can become biased due to partisanship problems. Therefore positive associations 
are found for both non-audit as well as audit services.  
The results of generally positive fee variable coefficients are also rather intuitive when 
one approaches the concepts using only common sense. Speculation on whether non-
audit services jeopardize auditor independence is built on the argument that they might, 
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through economies of scope, deepen the economic bond between the auditor and the 
audit client. It seems logical that an economic bond generally becomes stronger when a 
client becomes financially more important to the audit firm, regardless of what the fees 
are paid for. This reasoning is consistent with the results of this study, except for the 
fact that for example the client’s importance measured in tax service fees (RANKTAX) 
is not statistically significant at the 0,05 level, whereas the total economic importance  
of a client is. 
The total importance is measured by RANKTOT, which has one of the most statistically 
significant coefficients also in the robust results (p-value of 0,026), showing that while 
the total economic importance of a client has a significant association with the amount 
of auditor-allowed earnings management on a 0,05 level, this does not seem to be the 
case for most individual service categories. This might simply be due to the differences 
in the absolute fee amounts. The model’s fee variables aim to capture the economic 
importance of a client to his auditor, but it is clear that the total fees the auditor receives 
will be larger than the fees received for performing individual services. This might 
make the client’s total economic importance more important to the auditors’ decision 
making than the service type –specific one, thus leading to more significant associations 
between RANKTOT and earnings management than is the case for the other fee 
variables. 
Even though in this sample the share of non-audit fees from total fees is approximately 
20%, whereas for Frankel et al. (2002) the share of non-audit fees for big 4 auditors 
ranged from 67% to 75%, the positive coefficient estimates for the ratio of non-audit 
fees to total fees (FEERATIO) and the client’s economic importance as a non-audit 
service customer (RANKNON) are significant at the 0,05 level. This contradicts the 
previous argument that individual fee types would not be as significantly associated 
with earnings management as total fees are, simply because of their lower absolute 
amounts. Their significance could suggest that the agency –theory approach to auditor 
bias (see for example Simunic 1984) has some explanatory power: because of the 
economic rents received from providing both non-audit and audit services, the auditors 
providing more non-audit services might make the conscious decision to allow earnings 
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management through discretionary accruals in order to remain as the auditor, and to 
ensure the future economic rents stemming from the simultaneous provision of both 
services. Taken together, the results on FEERATIO and RANKNON imply that null 
hypothesis 1 (H01) can be rejected at the 0,05 significance level, indicating that there is 
a positive statistically significant association between non-audit services and earnings 
management. 
The heteroscedasticity-robust results show that tax services, measured in both the ratio 
of tax service fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO) as well as the economic importance 
of a client as a tax service customer (RANKTAX), do not seem to have a statistically 
significant association with earnings management even at a significance level of 0,1. 
This contradicts the findings of Choi et al. (2009), who found a statistically significant 
negative association, which they believed to be a product of knowledge spillovers. The 
coefficient estimates of this study are positive and statistically insignificant, providing 
no evidence to support the rejection of null hypothesis 2 (H02). Since the aim of this 
thesis is not attempt to measure knowledge spillovers, one can only conclude that no 
statistically significant association between tax services and earnings management was 
found, which in itself does not provide solid evidence on the possible absence or 
presence of knowledge spillovers. 
The economic importance of a client as an audit customer (RANKAUD) has a positive 
coefficient estimate that is statistically significant only at the 0,1 level, which indicates 
that there is a 10% risk that the positive coefficient, resulting from the model with this 
data, is just a product of chance. With this sample size one would expect a significance 
level lower than 0,1 which is why null hypothesis 3 (H03) cannot be rejected on the 
basis of these results. Audit services therefore do not seem to have a statistically 
significant association with earnings management. 
Before drawing final conclusions about the research hypotheses, I examine the 
robustness of the results following Frankel et al.’s (2002) example. As was the case 
with their sample, also the sample used in this study revealed large differences between 
auditor-specific fee compositions. Additionally, there might be a difference in the 
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propensity of an auditor allowing income increasing versus income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. There might also be a link between the size of the audit client 
and the incentive effects of the auditor. The following chapter aims to control for these 
differences in order to determine, how robust the inferences made from the total sample 
regressions are to changes in the before mentioned factors. 
 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Auditor Fee Composition 
 
The data description revealed that there are noticeable differences between the 
individual auditor fee compositions. For example Table 3 Panel B showed that non-
audit fees constitute 20% of the total fees for big 4 auditors, whereas the corresponding 
share for all non-big 4 auditors was a considerably lower 11,5%. Even within the big 4 
auditors this share ranges from 15% to 23%. It seems reasonable that when an audit 
firm receives a large amount of its fees from non-audit services that are in most part 
made up by tax services, the economic importance of a specific non-audit or tax service 
client is highlighted, leading to a possibly stronger association between the model’s fee 
variables (e.g. RANKNON and RANKTAX) and auditor-allowed earnings 
management. I test the robustness of the results across different audit fee compositions 
by running the regressions separately for firms with different auditors. Specifically the 
individual big 4 auditors are of interest, because of their higher shares of non-audit fees 
and the fact that they received 95% of the samples total fees. Non-big 4 auditors are 
grouped together in this analysis to examine what the association between the fee 
variables and earnings management is for auditors with typically lower shares of non-
audit fees. Table 12 reports the summary statistics on the fee variable (FEEVAR) 
coefficient estimates from auditor-specific regressions with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable.  
The results remain largely similar to the total sample case. In almost all cases the fee 
variables have a positive association with earnings management, and the only 
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coefficient estimate that is statistically significant at the 0,01 level is the one measuring 
the total economic importance of a client (RANKTOT) for PricewaterhouseCoopers. In 
two of the auditor-specific regressions RANKTOT has a p-value of approximately 0,01. 
These two auditors are PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young, which also have 
the highest total fees in addition to the largest shares of non-audit fees in the sample. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) illustrates the previously introduced argument that the 
measures of economic importance of a client might be connected with the underlying 
absolute fee amounts. PwC not only has the highest share of non-audit fees to total fees 
(23,5%), but also the highest absolute value of total fees in the whole sample 
(approximately 1 985 Million USD, equal to 32% of all total fees). It seems logical that 
the financially most important client of PwC as measured in total fees (RANKTOT) 
might have a stronger influence on the auditor’s decision making than the most 
important client of one of the non-big 4 auditors, where the absolute fee values are 
smaller. This logic is also supported by the results in the table. For all big 4 auditors the 
p-value of RANKTOT is close to or below 0,1 whereas the corresponding value for 
non-big 4 auditors is 0,378. The same applies to the economic importance of a client as 
an audit service customer (RANKAUD): KPMG, which has the highest share of audit 
fees to total fees of all big 4 auditors, has a positive RANKAUD coefficient estimate 
significant at the 0,05 level. 
For both PwC as well as E&Y also the economic importance of a client as a non-audit 
service customer (RANKNON) has a positive coefficient significant at the 0,1 level 
which can also be connected to the fact that these firms receive the highest amounts of 
non-audit fees in the sample. Ernst & Young also provides insight into the effect of tax 
fees, since its non-audit fees are composed of 61% tax service fees. The economic 
importance of a tax service client (RANKTAX) and the ratio of tax fees to total fees 
(TAXFEERATIO) are positively associated with earnings management, but have 
statistically insignificant coefficient estimates. This can also be seen to be reversely 
connected to the argument about absolute values: when one divides total fees into 
smaller parts and the economic importance of specific services, the strength of the 
association seems to diminish along with the absolute fee values in question.  
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TABLE 12 Summary of Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Auditor-Specific Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary 
Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports summary statistics on fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates from auditor-specific regressions with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the 
dependent variable and the sample sizes equal to the amount of clients per auditor or auditor group. For variable definitions please see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
                   
  
E&Y 
 
PwC 
 
Deloitte 
 
KPMG 
 
Non-Big 4 
 
Total Sample 
  
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
Regr. 1 FEERATIO 0,254 0,509 
 
0,224 0,102 
 
0,608 0,338 
 
0,449 0,509 
 
0,027 0,095 
 
0,332 0,040 
 
Adj. R2 0,061 
 
0,107 
 
0,003 
 
0,370 
 
0,920 
 
0,468 
 
n 580 
 
458 
 
387 
 
346 
 
644 
 
2415 
                   Regr. 2 RANKNON 0,040 0,055 
 
0,002 0,031 
 
0,007 0,197 
 
0,000 0,864 
 
0,001 0,436 
 
0,002 0,017 
 
RANKAUD 0,003 0,210 
 
0,001 0,288 
 
0,008 0,135 
 
0,005 0,015 
 
0,001 0,398 
 
0,002 0,097 
 
Adj. R2 0,073 
 
0,119 
 
0,008 
 
0,347 
 
0,920 
 
0,470 
 
n 580 
 
458 
 
387 
 
346 
 
644 
 
2415 
                   Regr. 3 RANKTOT 0,006 0,014 
 
0,002 < 0,01 
 
0,120 0,113 
 
0,005 0,088 
 
0,001 0,378 
 
0,003 0,026 
 
Adj. R2 0,071 
 
0,116 
 
0,008 
 
0,350 
 
0,920 
 
0,469 
 
n 580 
 
458 
 
387 
 
346 
 
644 
 
2415 
                   Regr. 4 TAXFEERATIO 0,536 0,309 
 
0,039 0,729 
 
2,266 0,326 
 
-0,419 0,311 
 
0,038 0,870 
 
0,487 0,239 
 
Adj. R2 0,063 
 
0,094 
 
0,010 
 
0,345 
 
0,920 
 
0,468 
 
n 580 
 
458 
 
387 
 
346 
 
644 
 
2415 
                   Regr. 5 RANKTAX 0,002 0,142 
 
0,000 0,435 
 
0,009 0,255 
 
-0,001 0,429 
 
0,000 0,640 
 
0,001 0,225 
 
RANKOTH 0,000 0,832 
 
0,001 0,086 
 
-0,006 0,427 
 
0,001 0,657 
 
0,001 0,164 
 
0,000 0,796 
 
RANKAUD 0,004 0,111 
 
0,001 0,163 
 
0,008 0,139 
 
0,005 0,023 
 
0,001 0,403 
 
0,002 0,081 
 
Adj. R2 0,069 
 
0,115 
 
0,012 
 
0,345 
 
0,92 
 
0,47 
 
n 580 
 
458 
 
387 
 
346 
 
644 
 
2415 
                                
Table 12 Summary of Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Auditor-Specific Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable
 56 
 
Put together, the analysis across auditors with different fee compositions shows that the 
inferences about the effects of non-audit (FEERATIO, RANKNON) and audit services 
(RANKAUD) are sensitive to auditor fee composition, whereas tax services 
(RANKTAX, TAXFEERATIO) remain robustly insignificant across the auditor 
spectrum. Previous conclusions about H01 and H03 are therefore to be viewed 
skeptically, whereas conclusions about H02 remain robust.  
Income Increasing and Decreasing Discretionary Accruals 
 
In addition to examining whether the fees and economic importance of a client affects 
the magnitude of earnings management allowed by an auditor, I also examine whether 
this effect is different for income increasing and income decreasing earnings 
management. This is done by running the regression separately on firms with income 
increasing discretionary accruals (DACC+) and firms with income decreasing 
discretionary accruals (DACC-) using the real values of these positive/negative accruals 
as the dependent variable. The summary statistics on the fee variable (FEEVAR) 
coefficient estimates from these regressions are presented in Table 13. 
The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the results of the main model. Fee 
variables for the 1416 firms with income increasing discretionary accruals (DACC+) are 
mostly positive, indicating that the share of fees and the economic importance of a 
client are positively associated with earnings management. The coefficients have 
however lost some of their statistical significance and only the ratio of non-audit fees to 
total fees (FEERATIO), the total economic importance of a client (RANKTOT) and the 
economic importance of a client as an audit service customer (RANKAUD) have p-
values close to 0,1. It is also noticeable that the association between RANKTOT is more 
significant for big 4 auditors, which again shows that the overall economic importance 
of a client has a stronger effect on auditor-allowed earnings management with auditors 
receiving higher fees. Because big 4 auditors also receive higher shares of their total 
fees from non-audit services than non-big 4 auditors do, their coefficient estimate for 
the economic importance of a client as a non-audit service customer (RANKNON) is 
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also more significant than it is for non-big 4 auditors. The opposite applies to 
RANKAUD: non-big 4 firms receive nearly 90% of their fees from audit services, 
which results in a more significant RANKAUD coefficient estimate for non-big 4 
auditors. 
The 999 firms with income decreasing discretionary accruals (DACC-) also have mostly 
negative coefficient estimates, showing that the share of fees and the economic 
importance of a client are positively associated with an increase in the amount of 
income decreasing accruals. For big 4 firms with income decreasing accruals, the 
coefficient estimates for the client’s economic importance measured in non-audit, audit 
and total fees (RANKNON, RANKAUD and RANKTOT) are statistically significant at 
the 0,1 level. The coefficient estimates for RANKNON and RANKTOT are again 
statistically more significant for big 4 auditors than for non-big 4 auditors, as was also 
the case in the DACC+ regressions, but interestingly enough, the significance levels of 
RANKAUD are arranged in the opposite way to the previous case: for income 
decreasing accruals the coefficient estimate seems to be more significant for big 4 
auditors. This indicates that while there was no association to be found between 
RANKAUD and positive accruals for big 4 firms, for negative accruals there seems to 
be an association between the economic importance of a client measured in audit 
service fees and the amount of negative discretionary accruals. Big 4 firms therefore 
seem to have a stronger tendency to allow income decreasing discretionary accruals 
(DACC-) in their audit service clients than non-big 4 firms do. For income increasing 
accruals (DACC+) the opposite statement applies. 
Since the purpose of this sensitivity analysis however is to find out whether auditors 
have a tendency to allow more income increasing versus income decreasing earnings 
management with the use of discretionary accruals, one can only focus on the results for 
all firms with positive accruals and all firms with negative accruals. 
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TABLE 13 Summary of Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Regressions with Income Increasing/Decreasing Discretionary Accruals as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports summary statistics on fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates from regressions with income increasing/decreasing discretionary accruals (DACC+/DACC-) as the dependent 
variable and the sample sizes specific to the auditor groups shown below. For variable definitions please see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
                   
  
DACC+ Regressions by Auditor Group 
 
DACC- Regressions by Auditor Group  
  
Big 4  
 
Non-Big 4 
 
All Auditors 
 
Big 4  
 
Non-Big 4 
 
All Auditors 
  
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
Regr. 1 FEERATIO 0,441 0,108 
 
0,037 0,760 
 
0,294 0,122 
 
-0,129 0,616 
 
-0,252 0,389 
 
-0,133 0,508 
 
Adj. R2 0,026 
 
0,925 
 
0,195 
 
0,150 
 
0,936 
 
0,742 
 
n 1026 
 
390 
 
1416 
 
745 
 
254 
 
999 
                   Regr. 2 RANKNON 0,003 0,089 
 
-0,001 0,164 
 
0,001 0,240 
 
-0,003 0,064 
 
-0,002 0,210 
 
-0,002 0,025 
 
RANKAUD 0,001 0,694 
 
0,001 0,067 
 
0,002 0,014 
 
-0,005 0,040 
 
-0,000 0,952 
 
-0,002 0,299 
 
Adj. R2 0,025 
 
0,927 
 
0,196 
 
0,163 
 
0,936 
 
0,744 
 
n 1026 
 
390 
 
1416 
 
745 
 
254 
 
999 
                   Regr. 3 RANKTOT 0,003 0,071 
 
0,001 0,102 
 
0,003 <0,01 
 
-0,007 0,016 
 
-0,001 0,790 
 
-0,003 0,153 
 
Adj. R2 0,026 
 
0,926 
 
0,196 
 
0,163 
 
0,935 
 
0,744 
 
n 1026 
 
390 
 
1416 
 
745 
 
254 
 
999 
                   Regr. 4 TAXFEERATIO 0,832 0,239 
 
-0,087 0,621 
 
0,649 0,249 
 
-0,021 0,928 
 
-0,220 0,712 
 
0,059 0,773 
 
Adj. R2 0,028 
 
0,925 
 
0,197 
 
0,150 
 
0,935 
 
0,742 
 
n 1026 
 
390 
 
1416 
 
745 
 
254 
 
999 
                   Regr. 5 RANKTAX 0,003 0,256 
 
-0,001 0,332 
 
0,001 0,342 
 
-0,002 0,121 
 
-0,000 0,729 
 
-0,001 0,611 
 
RANKOTH -0,003 0,401 
 
0,000 0,802 
 
-0,001 0,427 
 
-0,002 0,202 
 
-0,002 0,225 
 
-0,002 0,057 
 
RANKAUD 0,002 0,321 
 
0,001 0,081 
 
0,002 0,019 
 
-0,005 0,031 
 
-0,000 0,901 
 
-0,003 0,268 
 
Adj. R2 0,026 
 
0,926 
 
0,196 
 
0,163 
 
0,935 
 
0,744 
 
n 1026 
 
390 
 
1416 
 
745 
 
254 
 
999 
Table 13 Summary of Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Regressions with Income Increasing/Decreasing Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable
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Generally it is noticeable that the coefficient estimates for the ratio of non-audit fees to 
total fees (FEERATIO), the economic importance of a client as an audit service 
customer (RANKAUD), the total economic importance of a client (RANKTOT), the 
ratio of tax service fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO) as well as the importance of a 
client as a tax service customer (RANKTAX) are statistically more significant in the 
income increasing discretionary accrual (DACC+) regressions. From these RANKAUD 
and RANKTOT are statistically significant at the 0,1 level, which they are not in the 
DACC- regressions. This implies that the effect of the economic importance measured 
by these variables tends to have a stronger association with earnings management in the 
case of income increasing accruals. 
The DACC- regressions on the other hand show a stronger association between the 
economic importance of a client as a non-audit service customer (RANKNON) and 
earnings management than is the case for income increasing accruals. RANKTAX and 
TAXFEERATIO remain consistently above a statistically insignificant p-value of 0,1 in 
all of the regressions.  
Taken together the sensitivity tests concerning income increasing and income 
decreasing accruals provide evidence that inferences made about the association of non-
audit services and earnings management (H01) and the association between audit 
services and earnings management (H03)  are sensitive to the direction of earnings 
management, whereas conclusions about the association between tax services and 
earnings management (H02) remain robust. 
Effects of Firm Size 
 
Frankel et al. (2002) also control for possible nonlinearities between the size of the 
firms and the incentive effects of auditor fees. I examine the same effects by 
partitioning the sample into quartiles based on the variable controlling for size 
(LOGMVE i.e. the natural logarithm of market value of equity). It may be the case that 
the incentive effects of the fee variables differ for different sized firms, so the 
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regressions are run for each quartile and for firms above/under the median LOGMVE 
value. Following Frankel et al. (2002), I leave LOGMVE as an explanatory variable 
also in these models to control for cross-sectional variation of firm size within the 
quartiles and partitioned sample. Table 14 reports summary statistics on the fee variable 
(FEEVAR) coefficient estimates from the regressions for each firm-size quartile as well 
as the sample partitioned at the median value of LOGMVE. All regressions have the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable. 
The coefficient estimates remain consistently positive as in the main model, but some 
patterns emerge from the p-values. For the two smallest firm size quartiles, none of the 
fee variables are statistically significant at the 0,1 level but the models’ adjusted R-
squared values are consistently large. This indicates that the model’s control variables 
explain the variance of ABSDACC quite well, and that the association between the ratio 
of non-audit (FEERATIO) and tax service fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO) as well 
as the economic importance of a client measured in non-audit fees (RANKNON), audit 
fees (RANKAUD) and tax fees (RANKTAX) are not statistically significant. For firms 
in the upper two quartiles the p-values of the fee variables all in all tend to be smaller 
indicating a stronger association between them and earnings management.  
The coefficients of the total economic importance of a client (RANKTOT) and the 
importance measured in audit fees (RANKAUD) have p-values close to or below 0,01 
in the largest quartile. This might be the case simply because larger firms pay larger 
fees, which highlights the incentive of the auditor to allow earnings management. In 
fact, when one examines the correlation between total/audit fees and LOGMVE in the 
sample, strong and statistically very significant positive correlations with Spearman’s 
rhos of 0,826 and 0,824 are found. Spearmans rho for total fees and audit fees again is 
an even stronger 0,987. 
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TABLE 14 Summary of Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Firm-Size-Specific Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals 
as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports summary statistics on fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates from regressions with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable and the 
sample divided into quartiles based on the natural logarithm of market value (LOGMVE) and into two subsamples at the LOGMVE median. For variable definitions please see Table 4 on pages 31-32. 
                   
  
Sample Partitioned at LOGMVE Quartiles 
 
at LOGMVE Median 
  
Quartile 1 
 
Quartile 2 
 
Quartile 3 
 
Quartile 4 
 
Below 
 
Above 
  
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
Regr. 1 FEERATIO 0,126 0,273 
 
0,155 0,375 
 
0,586 0,165 
 
0,153 0,692 
 
0,193 0,063 
 
0,524 0,139 
 
Adj. R2 0,963 
 
0,746 
 
0,034 
 
0,159 
 
0,888 
 
0,046 
 
n 604 
 
603 
 
604 
 
604 
 
1207 
 
1208 
                   Regr. 2 RANKNON 0,000 0,299 
 
0,000 0,501 
 
0,005 0,150 
 
0,003 0,155 
 
0,001 0,319 
 
0,005 0,043 
 
RANKAUD 0,000 0,851 
 
0,001 0,424 
 
0,007 0,151 
 
0,010 0,012 
 
0,000 0,786 
 
0,008 0,012 
 
Adj. R2 0,963 
 
0,746 
 
0,041 
 
0,187 
 
0,887 
 
0,062 
 
n 604 
 
603 
 
604 
 
604 
 
1207 
 
1208 
                   Regr. 3 RANKTOT 0,000 0,848 
 
0,002 0,260 
 
0,009 0,078 
 
0,012 0,012 
 
0,001 0,226 
 
0,012 < 0,01 
 
Adj. R2 0,963 
 
0,747 
 
0,041 
 
0,186 
 
0,887 
 
0,061 
 
n 604 
 
603 
 
604 
 
604 
 
1207 
 
1208 
                   Regr. 4 TAXFEERATIO 0,000 0,991 
 
0,295 0,129 
 
1,453 0,306 
 
-0,093 0,628 
 
0,174 0,166 
 
0,923 0,245 
 
Adj. R2 0,963 
 
0,746 
 
0,038 
 
0,159 
 
0,887 
 
0,048 
 
n 604 
 
603 
 
604 
 
604 
 
1207 
 
1208 
                   Regr. 5 RANKTAX 0,000 0,658 
 
0,001 0,129 
 
0,004 0,345 
 
0,001 0,584 
 
0,001 0,219 
 
0,003 0,267 
 
RANKOTH 0,001 0,268 
 
0,000 0,663 
 
-0,003 0,518 
 
0,002 0,179 
 
0,001 0,204 
 
0,000 0,882 
 
RANKAUD 0,000 0,812 
 
0,001 0,523 
 
0,008 0,120 
 
0,011 < 0,01 
 
0,000 0,850 
 
0,010 0,010 
 
Adj. R2 0,963 
 
0,747 
 
0,041 
 
0,185 
 
0,887 
 
0,059 
 
n 604 
 
603 
 
604 
 
604 
 
1207 
 
1208 
                                
Table 14 Summary of Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Firm-Size-Specific Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable
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The rising incentives are also clearly visible in the regressions run with a sample 
partitioned at the median value of LOGMVE. For below-median sized firms, only the 
ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO) is significant on the 0,1 level, whereas 
for above-median sized firms the economic importance of a client as a non-audit service 
customer (RANKNON) and audit customer (RANKAUD) become significant at the 0,1 
level and the total economic importance of a client (RANKTOT) is of high statistical 
significance (p-value < 0,01). 
In summary, the results on sensitivity tests regarding firm size revealed that the 
association between the total economic importance of a client and earnings management 
becomes stronger, the larger the client firm is. This again could relate to the fact that the 
absolute fees received by the auditor most likely also increase along with client firm’s 
size (LOGMVE). The results also show that conclusions about the association between 
non-audit services and earnings management (H01) and about the association between 
audit services and earnings management (H03) are sensitive and specific to firm size. 
The inferences about tax services and earnings management (H02) remain robust across 
different LOGMVE quartiles. 
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6) Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examined the effects of auditor-provided non-audit services and tax services 
on auditor independence. The question of whether non-audit services jeopardize auditor 
independence has been the topic of a heated debate in accounting literature since the 
Enron-crisis and academics as well as regulators have not seemed to come to a common 
conclusion about the effects the different non-audit services have on auditors. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act however prohibited a large number of specific services, which were 
seen to have a negative effect on auditor independence. Tax services were not included 
in the list, implying that the effects of these services should somehow differ from the 
ones of other consulting services. Research on all consulting services however has 
yielded contradictory results and this paper set out to illustrate the possible effects of tax 
services using prior research on all services as a framework, as well as to shed some 
light on the issue whether the effects of tax services actually are significantly different 
from the other non-audit services. 
The literature review illustrated the possible effects of non-audit and tax services using 
agency theoretical and audit risk model based arguments as a framework. Prior research 
had divided auditor independence into independence in appearance as well as 
independence of mind, which were found to be linked to the provision of non-audit 
services and different audit quality measures. The joint provision of both audit as well 
as non-audit services can be seen to have a negative effect on auditor independence, but 
on the other hand the audit risk model implies that knowledge spillovers from 
performing these services could also lead to enhanced audit quality. A look into prior 
literature indicated that equity holders do not separate the different non-audit service 
types from another but fear that all non-audit services could jeopardize auditor 
independence. Their view contradicts the special treatment of tax services in current 
legislation. Additionally the review showed that equity holders’ perceptions on auditor-
provided tax services have thus far not been examined, indicating a need for future 
research into the topic. Contrary to equity holders, research from lenders’ perspectives 
seemed to favor the knowledge spillover effects of non-audit services, although 
evidence on their effects on audit quality and efficiency were also mixed. Tax services 
 64 
 
were in some cases pointed out as a special type of service that can lead to positive audit 
quality effects without considerably adding to auditor independence concerns. Research 
on the effects of auditor tenure and the possible link between non-audit services and 
increased earnings management were especially mixed. Generally the literature review 
showed that tax services have nearly always been grouped together with the other 
services, even though the evidence suggests that the effects of different service types 
can differ from another (see e.g. Frankel et al. 2002).  
The empirical part of the study aimed to shed light on this issue by disaggregating tax 
services from other service types in order to find out their individual effects on auditor 
independence. Generally speaking, the competing arguments to explain auditor bias are 
the ones based on agency theory (e.g. Simunic 1984), where the auditor makes a 
decision to use his judgment in the favor of the management’s interest, and the ones 
based on behavioral literature (e.g. Moore et al. 2002), where auditor bias is the result of 
unconscious partisanship purely due to affiliation with the client. The methods used in 
the paper followed the research of Frankel et al. (2002) which approaches independence 
concerns by examining whether strong economic bonds between and auditor and a 
client lead to opportunistic earnings management with the use of discretionary accruals. 
A modification to the method also allowed a separate examination of tax services. The 
methods used therefore aimed to capture auditor independence effects instead of 
measuring effects on auditor competence or the magnitude of knowledge spillovers. 
The three empirical null hypotheses of the paper were as follows: H01: Auditor-
provided non-audit services are not associated with earnings management, H02: 
Auditor-provided tax services are not associated with earnings management and finally 
H03: Audit services are not associated with earnings management. The sample used in 
the models consisted of 2415 individual North American firms (firm year 2010) of 
which 73% were audited by a big 4 auditor. Descriptive statistics on the sample showed 
that there are significant differences between auditor fee compositions and the amount 
of fees paid for individual auditors. For example, big 4 firms received 95% of the total 
fees and 97% of the total non-audit fees in the sample while only auditing 73% of the 
sample companies. The descriptive statistics also indicated that tax service fees are a 
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significant income source for big 4 auditors, in most cases constituting over half of the 
billed non-audit services. The empirical model used the cross-sectional modified Jones 
(1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals (as a proxy for earnings management), 
which were then regressed against a modified model of Frankel et al. (2002). Table 15 
Panel A summarizes the expected and actual research results on the non-audit and other 
fee variables used in the model. Panel B reports a summary on the hypothesis test 
results and their sensitivity analysis. 
After checking for outliers, normally distributed residuals, the assumption about 
homoscedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation, a regression with 
heteroscedasticity-robust results yields the coefficient estimates and p-values reported in 
the table. The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO) and the economic 
importance of a client measured in non-audit fees (RANKNON) are statistically 
significant at the 0,05 level indicating that there seems to be a positive association 
between non-audit services and earnings management, which leads to a rejection of null 
hypothesis 1 (H01). The other null hypotheses (H02 and H03) cannot be rejected at this 
significance level given that the coefficient estimates for the economic importance of a 
client measured in audit and tax service fees (RANKAUD and RANKTAX) as well as 
the ratio of tax service fees to total fees (TAXFEERATIO) have p-values larger than 
0,05. The fact that all fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates have positive signs 
is in line with the behavioral literature’s explanation for auditor bias. Additionally, the 
positive coefficient estimates might imply that an economic bond increases auditor bias, 
regardless of what service the fees creating the bond are paid for. 
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TABLE 15 Summary of Expected and Actual Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from 
Regressions with the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable 
and a Look at the Sensitivity Analysis of the Results 
 
Panel A of this table reports a summary of the expected and actual results for the fee variable (FEEVAR) coefficient estimates 
from regressions with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as the dependent variable and the sample size 
equal to 2415. Panel B provides an overview of the hypothesis test results based on the significance levels of the fee variable 
(FEEVAR) coefficient estimates, in addition to illustrating their sensitivity to the several robustness tests performed in this 
study. The three empirical hypotheses of this study in null form were as follows: H01: Auditor-provided non-audit services are 
not associated with earnings management, H02: Auditor-provided tax services are not associated with earnings management 
and finally H03: Audit services are not associated with earnings management. For variable definitions please see Table 4 on 
pages 31-32. 
       Panel A: Expected and Actual Results for Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates 
 
       
 
Expected Results 
 
Actual Results 
Variable Name Coeff.  Sign Coeff. p-value Based on e.g. 
 
Coeff.  Sign Coeff. p-value 
       
FEERATIO + <0,01 
Frankel et al. 
(2002)  
+ 0,040 
RANKNON + <0,01 
Frankel et al. 
(2002)  
+ 0,017 
RANKAUD - <0,01 
Frankel et al. 
(2002)  
+ 0,097 
RANKTOT + <0,01 
Frankel et al. 
(2002)  
+ 0,026 
TAXFEERATIO - ? 
SOX by 
Implication  
+ 0,239 
RANKTAX - ? 
SOX by 
Implication  
+ 0,225 
RANKOTH + ? 
Frankel et al. 
(2002)  
+ 0,796 
RANKAUD - <0,01 
Frankel et al. 
(2002)  
+ 0,081 
       
       Panel B: Hypothesis Test (α=0,05) & Sensitivity Analysis Results 
  
       
  
Sensitivity to Robustness Tests (Yes/No) 
 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Original 
Result 
Auditor Fee 
Composition 
Accrual 
Income Effect 
Firm Size 
Effect 
 
       H01 - Non-Audit Rejected Yes Yes Yes 
 H02 - Tax Accepted No No No 
 H03 - Audit Accepted Yes Yes Yes 
               
Table 15 Summary of Expected and Actual Fee Variable Coefficient Estimates from Regressions with the Absolute 
Value of Discretionary Accruals as the Dependent Variable and a Look at the Sensitivity Analysis of the Results 
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The total economic importance of a client (RANKTOT) has a statistically significant 
coefficient at the 0,05 level, which is not the case for all variables measuring the 
economic importance of a client within specific service categories. These results might 
simply have to do with the fact that the absolute fee values behind the total economic 
importance are significantly higher, which could lead to the total importance variable 
having a stronger influence on auditors’ decision making. The argument of higher 
values behind the importance measure is however contradicted by the also significant 
coefficient estimates for the non-audit fee variables measuring the ratio of non-audit 
fees to total fees (FEERATIO) and the economic importance of the client as a non-audit 
service customer (RANKNON). These results could be explained by the agency theory 
–approach to auditor bias: auditors providing also non-audit services might make a 
conscious decision to allow earnings management in order to ensure receiving future 
economic rents from the joint provision of audit and non-audit services.  
All results were subjected to an additional sensitivity analysis which examined whether 
the individual auditor fee composition, the fact whether the client uses income 
increasing or decreasing discretionary accruals, or the different sizes of the clients affect 
the associations between the fee variables examined and auditor-allowed earnings 
management. The results of these robustness tests are summarized in Table 15 Panel B. 
The analysis of the effects of auditor fee composition revealed that inferences on null 
hypotheses 1 and 3 were largely affected by the fact whether the auditors’ total fees 
were mainly composed of non-audit or audit fees. Results concerning null hypothesis 2 
were robust throughout the auditor spectrum. Generally the results showed that in the 
examination of the economic importance of a client, one cannot ignore the underlying 
absolute fee values since it seems to be the case that the economic importance variables 
that have larger fee sums behind them in absolute terms tend to also have a stronger 
association with earnings management. 
The discretionary accruals regressions, which took their income effects into 
consideration, showed that the economic importance of an audit service client 
(RANKAUD) has a stronger association with earnings management when it comes to 
income increasing discretionary accruals, for non-audit fee variables (e.g. RANKNON) 
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the association seemed to be stronger in the case of income decreasing accruals. The 
significance of the tax service variables (TAXFEERATIO and RANKTAX) remained 
robust. The test therefore showed that the original inferences about H01 and H03 are 
sensitive to the sign of the discretionary accruals whereas conclusions about H02 remain 
the same regardless of the accrual sign. 
The final robustness test examined whether associations between the fee variables and 
jeopardized auditor independence remain constant for different sized firms. The test 
revealed that the audit fee (RANKAUD) and non-audit fee (RANKNON) variables are 
more significant for larger firms, indicating again unreliability in the conclusions 
originally made about H01 and H03. The economic importance of a client as a tax 
service customer (RANKTAX) and the ratio of tax service fees to total fees 
(TAXFEERATIO) remain consistently statistically insignificant throughout different 
sized client firms indicating that conclusions about H02 are once again robust. 
In summary this study showed results indicating a statistically significant positive 
association between non-audit services and jeopardized auditor independence in the 
terms of auditor-allowed earnings management. The coefficient estimates for both the 
ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO) as well as the economic importance of 
the client as a non-audit service customer (RANKNON) are both positively associated 
with the use of discretionary accruals at a 0,05 significance level. However, these results 
are not robust across different sized firms, the income effect of the earnings 
management or auditor fee composition. For audit services (RANKAUD), no 
association was found for the total sample, but it seems that these results are also not 
robust. Generally the results also indicate that auditor bias in the form of auditor-
allowed earnings management can also be based on an economic dependency between 
an auditor and the client resulting purely out of audit fees, as long as the underlying 
financial importance in absolute terms is significant enough for the auditor. 
To address the underlying research question about the individual effects of tax services 
(measured by RANKTAX and TAXFEERATIO), one can state the following: This 
paper provides heteroscedasticity-robust evidence that there is no statistically significant 
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association between auditor-provided tax services and earnings management. The 
results are robust to differences in auditor fee composition, the direction of the earnings 
management as well as to audit client firm size. Since the goal of this paper and the 
methods used in it was not to measure possible knowledge spillovers, one can only 
speculate whether the absence of such an association could mean that there are no audit-
quality improving knowledge spillovers retainable from the provision of tax services, or 
that the provision of tax services simply has no effect on auditor independence. 
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Appendix A: Macro for Heteroscedasticity-Robust Regression 
The following code written by Hayes et al. (2007) creates a macro named HCREG that 
computes heteroscedasticity-consistent p-values, when the function is called in the IBM 
SPSS Statistics syntax. To get p-values and standard error estimators as defined by 
MacKinnon and White (1985), one needs to input “method = 3” in the syntax of the 
HCREG command. Additional details on the other command options and the methods 
used can be found in the paper of Hayes et al. (2007). 
Code to create the HCREG macro in IBM SPSS Statistics: 
 
DEFINE hcreg (dv =!charend ('/')/iv =!charend ('/') 
             /test = !charend('/') !default (0) 
             /const = !charend('/') !default(1) 
             /method = !charend ('/') !default (3) 
             /covmat = !charend('/') !default(0)). 
PRESERVE. 
set length = none. 
SET MXLOOP = 100000000. 
MATRIX. 
GET x/file = */variables = !dv !iv/names = dv/missing = omit. 
compute y=x(:,1). 
compute x=x(:,2:ncol(x)). 
compute iv5 = x. 
compute pr = ncol(x). 
compute n = nrow(x). 
compute L = ident(pr). 
compute tss=cssq(y)-(((csum(y)&**2)/n)*(!const <> 0)). 
do if (!const = 0). 
  compute iv = t(dv(1,2:ncol(dv))). 
  compute df2 = n-pr. 
else. 
  compute iv = t({"Constant", dv(1,2:ncol(dv))}). 
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  compute con = make(n,1,1). 
  compute x={con,x}. 
  compute df2 = n-pr-1. 
  compute L1 = make(1,pr,0). 
  compute L = {L1;L}. 
end if. 
compute dv=dv(1,1). 
compute b = inv(t(x)*x)*t(x)*y). 
compute k = nrow(b). 
compute invXtX = inv(t(x)*x). 
compute h = x(:,1). 
loop i=1 to n. 
  compute h(i,1)= x(i,:)*invXtX*t(x(i,:)). 
end loop. 
compute resid = (y-(x*b)). 
compute mse = csum(resid&**2)/(n-ncol(x)). 
compute pred = x*b. 
compute ess= cssq(resid). 
 do if (!method = 2 or !method = 3). 
  loop i=1 to k. 
    compute x(:,i) = (resid&/(1-h)&**(1/(4-!method)))&*x(:,i). 
  end loop. 
 end if. 
 do if (!method = 0 or !method = 1). 
  loop i=1 to k. 
    compute x(:,i) = resid&*x(:,i). 
  end loop. 
 end if. 
 do if (!method = 5). 
   loop i=1 to k. 
    compute x(:,i) = sqrt(mse)&*x(:,i). 
  end loop. 
 end if. 
do if (!method = 4). 
 compute mn = make(n,2,4). 
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 compute pr3 = n-df2. 
 compute mn(:,2) = (n*h)/pr3. 
 compute ex=rmin(mn). 
  loop i=1 to k. 
    compute x(:,i) = (resid&/(1-h)&**(ex/2))&*x(:,i). 
  end loop. 
 end if. 
compute hc = invXtX*t(x)*x*invXtX. 
do if (!method = 1). 
  compute hc = (n/(n-k))&*hc. 
end if. 
compute F = (t(t(L)*b)*inv(t(L)*hc*L)*((t(L)*b)))/pr). 
compute pf = 1-fcdf(f,pr,df2). 
compute r2 = (tss-ess)/tss. 
compute pf = {r2,f,pr,df2,pf}. 
do if (!method <> 5). 
print !method/title = "HC Method"/format F1.0. 
end if. 
print dv/title = "Criterion Variable"/format A8. 
print pf/title = "Model Fit:"/clabels = "R-sq" "F" "df1" "df2" "p"/format F10.4. 
compute sebhc = sqrt(diag(hc)). 
compute te = b&/sebhc. 
compute p = 2*(1-tcdf(abs(te), n-nrow(b))). 
compute oput = {b,sebhc, te, p}. 
do if (!method <> 5). 
print oput/title = 'Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results'/clabels  
       = "Coeff" "SE(HC)" "t" "P>|t|"/rnames = iv/format f10.4. 
else if (!method = 5). 
print oput/title = 'OLS Regression Results Assuming Homoscedasticity'/clabels  
       = "Coeff" "SE" "t" "P>|t|"/rnames = iv/format f10.4. 
end if. 
compute iv2 = t(iv). 
do if (!covmat = 1). 
print hc/title = 'Covariance Matrix of Parameter Estimates'/cnames =  
      iv/rnames = iv2/format f10.4. 
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end if. 
do if (!test > 0 and !test < pr). 
 compute L2 = make(pr-!test+!const,!test,0). 
 compute L = {L2;L((pr+1-!test+!const):(pr+!const),(pr-!test+1):(pr))}. 
 compute F = (t(t(L)*b)*inv(t(L)*hc*L)*((t(L)*b)))/!test). 
 compute pf = 1-fcdf(f,!test,df2). 
 compute pf = {f,!test,df2,pf}. 
 print pf/title = "Setwise Hypothesis Test" 
    /clabels = "F" "df1" "df2" "p"/format F10.4. 
 compute iv = t(iv((pr+1-!test+!const):(pr+!const),1)). 
 print iv/title = "Variables in Set:"/format A8. 
end if. 
END MATRIX. 
RESTORE. 
!END DEFINE. 
Syntax of the HCREG command, MacKinnon and White (1985) p-values set as default: 
HCREG dv = "variable_name" 
/iv = "variable_name1" "variable_name2", etc. 
/const = 1 
/method = 3 
/covmat = 1 
/test = 1 
 
